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Interpretive Preferences and the Limits of
the New Formalism
Adam B. Badawit
Abstract: A recent movement in contracts scholarship-the so-called New
Formalism-seeks to justify limitations on the introduction of extrinsic
evidence to interpret contracts on the instrumental grounds of efficiency and
empirical observation. Less attention has been directed at the development of a
similar instrumental argument for the more contextual types of interpretation
observed in the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts. This Article engages this question by arguing that the relative
ability of transactors to draft complete contracts is likely to be an important
determinant of their preferred interpretive regime.
Where low contracting costs allow commercial parties to draft relatively
complete contracts, it is understandable that these parties would have a strong
preference for formal contract rules. This approach may best ensure the
interpretation of these contracts in accordance with their express terms. But
when contracts are more difficult to write-and hence contain more gaps-
transactors may prefer interpretive rules that allow courts to fill in contractual
gaps based on extrinsic evidence such as industry custom, unexecuted drafts,
and other indications of the parties' understanding of their obligations under
the contract. At least in some instances, the use of this ex post evidence may be
more cost effective relative to the ex ante investments that would be necessary
to draft more complete contracts.
To explore this problem, this Article adapts the framework used to predict
vertical integration in the New Institutional Economics literature to identify the
variables that are likely to affect the ability to draft complete contracts. This
adapted model argues that the frequency and uncertainty of a transaction are
the key variables that will determine the amount that parties are likely to invest
in filling contractual gaps. The predictions generated by this model help to
explain why some transactors, such as the grain, cotton, and diamond
merchants studied by Lisa Bernstein, have strong preferences for formal
interpretation. The model also suggests why industries that involve infrequent
and uncertain transactions-such as construction, tailored software, and the
market for mergers and acquisitions-do not share the preference for formal
interpretation advocated and observed by the New Formalists.
t Bigelow Fellow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School. I thank Bob Cooter, Mel
Eisenberg, Rob MacCoun, and Oliver Williamson for valuable comments. All errors are my own.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ronald Coase's two most prominent papers teach that transaction costs are
a central determinant of legal and organizational boundaries. This insight
spurred the New Institutional Economics, an intellectual framework that
provides a detailed theory to predict how the transaction costs of contracting
are likely to determine the vertical boundaries of firms. 2 This literature has
identified a series of transactional attributes to predict when contractual risk is
likely to provide incentives for vertical integration. Vertical integration,
however, is only one mechanism for minimizing the transaction costs
associated with a particular type of purchase or sale. Formal and relational
contracts between firms and individuals and the dispute resolution regimes
chosen to resolve any related disputes provide another, less drastic, method for
managing the risk inherent in transactions. This Article uses and expands the
transactional attributes identified in the New Institutional Economics
framework to explain why different types of interpretive regimes, such as
general commercial arbitration, industry-specific arbitration, and public
litigation under common law and the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"),
might suit different kinds of transactions. This analysis suggests that the ex ante
decision of how much to invest in filling contractual gaps is a key determinant
of the interpretive regime that a given set of transactors is likely to prefer.
This theory has implications for the long-running debate between formalists
and contextualists that has been a central focus of contract scholarship for more
than a century. The early debates between staunch formalists such as
Christopher Columbus Langdell 3 and Samuel Williston4 and proponents of
contextual interpretation such as Arthur Corbin 5 and Karl Llewellyn were
I. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (exploring the boundaries
of firms); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. I (1960) (arguing that in the
absence of transaction costs parties will bargain to efficient results). As Coase later explained, the Coase
Theorem should be a "stepping stone on the way to an analysis of an economy with positive transaction
costs." Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 717 (1992).
2. Oliver E. Williamson is a chief figure in this literature. Williamson developed this theory in a
series of articles that were then consolidated and expanded in his seminal book MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975). See also Oliver Williamson, Markets
and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 316-25 (1973) (explaining the
variables that likely influence a firm's decision to either purchase goods on the spot market or produce
the goods internally); Oliver Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure
Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112-23 (1971) (same).
3. See generally C.C. LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2nd ed. 1880).
4. See generally SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1 st ed. 1920).
5. As Corbin explains: "In almost all cases of contract, legal relations will exist, from the very
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central to the development of American contract law. The work of these
formalists are featured prominently in the Restatement (First) of Contracts and
held "virtually absolute sway" over contract theory in the early twentieth
century. 6 The contextualists subsequently increased their influence during the
middle part of the century and their work strongly influenced the drafting of the
UCC and the Restatement (Second) of Contract Law.7 As a general matter,
these early debates between formalists and contextualists proceeded on the
assumption that one mode of interpretation was superior to the other-courts
should either interpret contracts in a formal manner that restricts the role of
extrinsic evidence or in a contextual matter that invites the introduction of
evidence from commercial reality-with little middle ground.
The underlying assumption that one interpretive approach is intrinsically
superior to another has, at least to some degree, persisted in more recent
debates. This modem contract scholarship has been heavily influenced by a
group of New Formalists, who have developed a series of powerful empirical
and theoretical critiques that challenge the contextualist vision realized in the
UCC and in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.8 For example, Lisa
Bernstein has carried out a series of empirical studies that question whether real
world transactors act in a manner that is consistent with the assumptions that
motivate the contextual rules in the UCC. Her work on the arbitration system of
the National Grain and Feed Association ("NGFA") questions the basis and
efficacy of the goal of Article 2 of the UCC to mirror commercial reality. 9 Her
investigation of the dispute resolution system of cotton traders casts doubt on
the accepted wisdom that expectation damages are the preferred remedy for
breach.' 0 Bernstein uses these empirical insights to make broad critiques of
moment of acceptance, that one or both of the parties never consciously expected would exist, and
therefore cannot be said to have intended. Furthermore, the life history of any single contract may cover
a long period of time, and new facts will occur after acceptance of the offer - facts that may gravely
affect the existing legal relations and yet may have been utterly unforeseen by the parties." Arthur L.
Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 YALE L.J. 739, 740 (1919).
6. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1743, 1749
(2000).
7. Llewellyn was one of the primary architects of the UCC. His scholarship and his imprint on the
UCC reflected his belief that commercial rules should mirror commercial reality. See, e.g., Karl N.
Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. REV. 873 (1939).
8. The terms "New Formalists" and "New Formalism" have been used to describe recent
scholarship that advocates more formal interpretation of contracts and more formal default rules on the
basis of instrumental reasons like as efficiency and observed preference. See, e.g., David Chamy, The
New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842 (1999). As Avery Katz explains, "[wihat is new
about this new formalism, both in contract scholarship and elsewhere, is that it attempts to explicitly
ground formalism in functional terms; it tries to show how formal methods of interpretation help to
forward practical goals such as efficiency, procedural fairness, and public accountability." Avery
Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
496, 499-500 (2004).
9. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996).
10. See Lisa Berstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Vol. 6.1, 2009
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contextual interpretation-for example, in her NGFA study she concludes that
"the [UCC's] highly contextualized approach to adjudication is flawed because
it mistakenly assumes that transactors' actions under a contract are the best
indication of what they intended their writing to mean.""I
The New Formalists also include a number of legal economists who have
questioned the efficacy of contextual interpretation. Omri Ben-Shahar has
written powerful theoretical pieces that question the value of erosion doctrines,
such as waiver and course of performance, that are central to the contextual
interpretation of contracts.12 Likewise, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott have
developed an economic model that disfavors the use of extrinsic evidence in the
interpretation of contracts between firms and, on the basis of this model, have
advocated a series of reforms that "would radically truncate current contract
law."' 3 As a general matter, these theoretical investigations by New Formalists
take a dim view of interpretive regimes that incorporate contextual default
rules.
This Article argues that the desirability of an interpretive regime depends,
at least to some degree, on the attributes of the underlying transaction and not
solely on the independent merits of formal or contextual interpretation. That
there is variation in interpretive preference is evident from the decisions of
some transactors, such as those studied by Bernstein, to opt out of the UCC as
well as from the choices of transactors not to opt out of the contextual default
rules supplied by the UCC. To explain this variation, this Article develops a
theory of investment in contract, which suggests that the cost and ability of
transactors to draft complete contracts is an important determinant of how
transactors will respond to a dispute resolution market that provides a wide
array of choices. This theory suggests that debates about the inherent
desirability of a given mode of contract interpretation should be driven by the
reasons for the wide variety of positive choices transactors make about their
desired dispute resolution forums rather than through economic models that
seek to accommodate all commercial actors or through empirical observations
of a limited slice of commercial behavior.
This model predicts that the less contextual rules endorsed by the New
Formalists are likely to be preferred where transactions are frequent and certain
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001).
II. Bernstein, supra note 9, at 1820. Bernstein also uses her findings to endorse a safe harbor
provision to Article 2 that would allow transactors to opt out of the Code's provisions on usage of trade,
course of performance, and course of dealing. Id. at 182 1. Bernstein does, however, suggest that the
more contextual provisions of the Code may be appropriate for disputes between merchant-to-consumer
relationships. Id. at 1820.
12. Omri Ben-Shahar, Erosion of Rights by Past Breach, I AM. REV. OF LAW AND ECON. 190
(1999); Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 781, 789-92
(1999).
13. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE
L.J. 541, 619 (2003).
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because those situations present optimal conditions for drafting nearly complete
contracts, which parties would want enforced by the agreement's express terms.
This preference is, perhaps, most evident in the high-frequency commodity
transactions studied by Bernstein. It is a much easier proposition to draft these
sorts of uncomplicated contracts that reflect significant experience with
repeated transactions than it is to draft a contract that will govern an infrequent
highly-complex transaction. Under these circumstances, the more contextual
rules supplied by Article 2 of the UCC and (to a lesser extent) by the common
law may provide the best available option for resolving disputes.
A recent Delaware case demonstrates that the parties to these types of
infrequent, uncertain, and high-stakes transactions may prefer a dispute
resolution forum that will be more solicitous of extrinsic evidence than the
industry-specific arbitration boards studied by Bernstein. In United Rentals,
Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc., Chancellor Chandler interpreted a merger
agreement that had inconsistent provisions as to the remedy if the transaction
failed to close. The merger agreement, drafted under intense time pressure,
was a highly complex document that governed a one-time transaction. As
discussed more fully below, the parties did not opt for a dispute resolution
forum that would limit itself to the terms of the contract; instead, the parties
chose a Delaware court that was willing to hold an extensive trial, during which
the court examined not only the terms of the contract, but also considered
extensive evidence of the drafting history-including a close analysis of
unexecuted drafts of the contract-and ultimately decided the case on the basis
of evidence of what one party knew about the subjective intent of the other
party.
While cases like United Rentals represent one end of the spectrum of
interpretive preferences, there are many other dispute resolution options that
can accommodate those who may not have such clearly defined desires for
formal or contextual interpretation. For example, general commercial
arbitration may be attractive where secrecy insulates transactors from damage
to reputation and publication of trade secrets.' 5 Likewise, insular communities
of transactors may be able to avoid this choice almost entirely because extra-
legal means of regulation and punishment provide an inexpensive and attractive
method of resolving commercial disputes.
This Article proceeds as follows: Section II draws on the New Institutional
Economics literature to identify the attributes of transactions that are likely to
have a significant effect on the costs of contracting. The general theme of this
14. United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc., 937 A.2d 810 (Del. Ch. 2007). See infra Sec. IV.B
for a discussion of applied examples including United Rentals.
15. While general commercial arbitration tends to involve contextual approaches to interpretation,
there is substantial variation because the interpretive approach taken in any given arbitration depends, in
large part, on the particular style of the arbitrator.
Vol. 6.1, 2009
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framework is that variables that make contracting more difficult and costly will
tend to favor more contextual rules for dispute resolution. Section III reviews
the work of New Formalists with reference to the framework introduced in
Section II. Section IV applies the framework developed in Section II in a more
technical manner by providing more detailed explanations of how the
individual attributes of a transaction are likely to affect the cost of contracting.
This section also uses the attributes of these transactions to predict the effect of
each variable on the likely interpretive preference of the participants in a
transaction with a given attribute. Section V synthesizes and concludes by
generating a set of predictions of interpretive preference based on the attributes
of different transactions.
II. A TRANSACTIONAL ATTRIBUTE MODEL
Oliver Williamson developed a celebrated framework for explaining
vertical integration. Williamson analyzed the "make or buy" decision by using
a series of transactional attributes to predict whether a firm would produce a
needed good or service in-house or turn to the spot market to purchase the good
or service. Williamson identified three primary variables in a transaction that
influence this make-or-buy decision: frequency, uncertainty, and asset
specificity. 16 This section explains Williamson's predictions of how these
variables are likely to impact vertical integration, and it then builds on this
analysis to predict how these variables are likely to affect the costs of
contracting. What emerges from this analysis is that frequency and uncertainty
are likely to have strong effects on the costs of contracting while asset
specificity has a more limited impact on these costs. In addition, this section
explains how the degree of insularity in a community of transactors can affect
the amount of investment in formal contracting. This framework of
transactional attributes provides a mechanism for evaluating and limiting some
of the claims of the New Formalists, which are examined more closely in
Section III. This framework also provides a set of predictions on how the
attributes of a transaction are likely to affect the preference of transactors for
different types of interpretive methods, which is analyzed in more detail in
Section IV.
A. Frequency
In the context of contracting, frequency refers to the number of times a firm
or individual carries out a particular type of transaction. Frequency is a
prominent variable in the analysis of vertical integration because as the
frequency of a given transaction increases, it creates economies of scale. If a
16. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975).
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firm makes use of a given good only infrequently, the marginal cost of
producing the good will be considerably higher than the marginal cost of
buying the good on the spot market. As the firm engages in a transaction more
frequently, however, the firm can realize the economies of scale associated
with production and eventually the production price will approximate the spot
market price. All other things being equal, as the frequency of a transaction
increases, the justification for producing a good in-house becomes stronger. By
producing in-house, the firm avoids the transaction costs and risks associated
with contracting for the good while also realizing the economy of scale that
comes with high frequency. 17
With respect to contract drafting, increased frequency of a particular
transaction will tend to reduce the cost of drafting a contract to govern that
transaction. The widespread use of form contracts attests to these economies of
scale. 18 As a transaction becomes more frequent, all other things being equal,
the marginal cost of drafting a contract to govern the transaction should tend to
decrease. One reason for the decrease in the per-transaction costs of contracting
is that a single form contract can govern multiple instances of a transaction. In
addition, with increased frequency, transactors can learn more about the
contours of the repeated transaction. This experience will likely translate into
better, more complete, contracts that govern the transaction. Where transactors
are able to draft nearly complete contracts, there may be a preference for more
formal types of adjudication because the contracts contain few gaps; thus, there
is little need for extrinsic evidence. Bernstein's study of NGFA contracts,
which govern transactions with a very high frequency, may provide an example
of this situation. 19
The frequency attribute also has important consequences for the efficiency
of norm generation. Robert Cooter advances the theory that norms in
decentralized industries evolve to efficiency, thus courts should use these
efficient norms to fill contractual gaps. 20 There is, however, significant debate
on the question of whether norms do in fact evolve to efficiency. Cooter argues
that where incentives support the generation of efficient commercial norms,
judges should raise these norms to the level of law. 21 Eric Posner is skeptical of
17. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, 60-61 (1985). See
also Claude Mgnard, A New Institutional Approach to Organization, in HANDBOOK OF NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 281, 285 (Claude M nard & M. Shirley eds., Ist ed. 2005).
18. See ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS, 178-79 (2000).
19. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 1774 ("Arbitrated claims over unforeseen contingencies are
rare.")
20. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1646 (1996) [hereinafter, Cooter, New
Law Merchant]; Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of
Decentralized Law, 13 INT'L. REV. L. & ECON. 215 (1994).
21. Cooter, New Law Merchant, supra note 20 at 1694-95. ("An appropriate incentive structure is
one in which incentives for signaling by individuals align with the public good (long-run relations,
Vol. 6.1, 2009
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the claim that norms reflect efficient practices and argues that norms are
unlikely to be efficient when judged by the standard that they "enable group
members to exploit the full surplus of collective action."
2 2
Posner identifies a number of reasons why norms might persist even though
they fail to allow a community to obtain all the gains that could be created
through joint action. He cites information costs and lags as potential sources of
inefficiency. To support this argument, he points out that in Harold Demsetz's
well-known study of property rights among native tribes in Canada the lag
between the development of property-right norms and the advent of the fur
trade was two hundred years. 23 Posner also argues that strategic behavior,
morality, envy, and negative externalities can contribute to the inefficiency of
norms by allowing a social rule to remain in place even though there may be
superior rules vis-A-vis social welfare. 24 This article formed the foundation of
Posner's book on social norms, which argues that norms are sometimes a
wasteful mechanism for signaling one's discount rate to others.25
convexity, no spill-overs.)")
22. Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1698 (1996).
23. Id. at 1712-13 (citing HAROLD DEMSETZ, OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, AND THE FIRM, 107-09
(1988)).
24. Id. at 1713-23.
25. See generally ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000). Though an in-depth
examination of the efficiency or inefficiency of norms is outside the scope of this project, several of
Posner's arguments bear on the desirability of incorporating norms into contracts. First, the standard
used by Posner is an ideal that does not take into account the transaction costs associated with a
governance mechanism such as social norms, legal rules, or different organizational forms. Although it
may be the case that using social norms to govem a particular phenomenon is inefficient relative to a
world free of transaction costs, it is the least inefficient governance mechanism when compared to other
alternatives. Second, and more importantly for the purposes of this project, the frequency of a given
transaction is almost certain to make an industry norm more efficient. Recognized norms provide a
means for quickly conveying information about appropriate practices, and as such, can reduce the
transactions costs associated with a given interaction. The more frequent a given transaction takes place,
or put differently, the more liquid the market for a transaction, the more comfortably one can assume
that a norm reflects roughly efficient practices. The reason a norm governing frequent transactions is
more likely to be efficient is that the increased frequency means that there are increased savings to be
had by altering the norm to make it more efficient. The prospect of these large savings puts competitive
pressure on the norm, which should lead to more efficient practices. Alternatively, if a transaction takes
place only infrequently then there is less competitive pressure to optimize the norm.
While frequency contributes to the efficiency of norms, it is important to distinguish different types of
frequency and the effect they are likely to have on the efficiency of norms. There are three relevant
dimensions of frequency. The first is global frequency, meaning the rate at which a transaction takes
place in the market place as a whole. The second type of frequency is firm-specific frequency, referring
to the number of times any one firm conducts a certain transaction. The last type of frequency is partner-
specific frequency, meaning the rate at which the same two parties conduct a certain transaction.
Where transactions are globally frequent, the likelihood of norms arising to govern these transactions is
high, all other things being equal. If, however, a transaction is globally frequent, and any given firm
conducts the transaction on an infrequent basis, there is probably a lower likelihood that the norms
concerning this transaction are both standardized and efficient. If a transaction is frequent on both global
and partner-specific dimensions, then the norms governing the transaction are likely to be efficient,
however because individual relationships may develop different contours it is less likely that norms will
be standardized across an industry. The ideal mix of frequency dimensions for producing standardized
and efficient norms are high rates of global and firm-specific frequency with relatively lower levels of
partner-specific frequency. Such a situation would be characterized by a group of buyers and sellers
HeinOnline  -- 6 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 9 2009
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B. Uncertainty
Another variable that has important implications for the governance of
transactions is uncertainty. In the Williamsonian analysis of vertical
integration, uncertainty increases the contractual risk associated with a given
transaction. 26 Uncertainty arises, in large measure, due to the concept of
bounded rationality-pioneered by Herbert Simon. Williamson characterizes
Simon's concept as referring to human limits "on the capacity to receive, store,
retrieve, and process information without error and to definitional limits
inherent in language." 27 Williamson argues that the uncertainty that comes with
bounded rationality leads to organizing transactions internally rather than
through reliance on spot markets. Relying on internal organizational
mechanisms attenuates the risks posed by opportunism inherent in market
transactions.
Williamson's definition of bounded rationality can be elaborated by
distinguishing between two types of uncertainty: predictive uncertainty and
linguistic uncertainty. Predictive uncertainty refers to a situation where the
number and type of contingencies associated with a given transaction are
unknown, which makes it difficult to identify contract terms to govern the
transaction. Linguistic uncertainty refers to situations where there is difficulty
in describing the nature of an agreement, which means that predicting the
outcome of litigation will be difficult. Both predictive and linguistic uncertainty
can complicate contracting by increasing the investment necessary to write a
sufficiently complete contract. There are several potential responses to these
types of uncertainty to mitigate the risk they create. First, if the problems are
especially acute there may be an incentive for vertical integration of businesses,
as long as there is sufficient transaction frequency to justify this decision.
Vertical integration eliminates the problems with dispute resolution and
interpretation analyzed here, because any dispute is dealt with through internal
edict rather than by a third party arbiter. Second, one may also observe
transactors opting out of legal systems they believe lead to uncertain
outcomes. 28 Bernstein's work on the independent arbitration systems of grain
dealers and cotton transactors examines this type of response to adjudication
under the sometimes uncertain provisions of Article 2 of the UCC.29 Finally,
conducting many similar transactions, where the rate that any one seller deals with the same buyer is
relatively low. This state of affairs would provide the brightest prospects for using norms to fill gaps
because those norms are likely to represent efficient practices.
26. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ANTITRUST ECONOMics 74-78 (1987).
27. Id. at 75-76 (citations omitted).
28. The term "opting out" does not mean leaving the system of public adjudication entirely. For
example, a group of transactors may opt out of most of the requirements of Article 2 of the UCC while
still resorting to other pieces of the UCC when less likely contingencies, such as bankruptcy, take place.
29. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 1771-77 (discussing the operation of the NGFA system);
Berstein, supra note 10, at 1726-28 (describing adjudication in the cotton industry).
Vol. 6.1, 2009
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transactors may choose to leave gaps in contracts and hope that if a transaction
goes awry and results in litigation, courts will be able to adequately fill the
gaps.
C. Asset Specificity
Asset specificity is a measure of how much value a firm can recoup from an
asset if a transaction goes awry. 30 The more specific an asset, the less a firm
can recoup from a failed transaction. The prototypical examples of specific
assets are car bodies. If a firm contracts with an auto manufacturer to make car
bodies, there is substantial contractual risk associated with this transaction-if
the transaction fails, there is little open market value for the car bodies because
they were specifically designed to meet the needs of the automobile
manufacturer. As a result, highly specific assets are strong candidates for
internal organization. The acquisition of Fisher Bodies by General Motors in
the 1920s is a common example of an auto manufacturer choosing to make
rather than buy a specific asset.3' In contrast, where a good is more fungible,
such as a tire, the asset is not as specific and a firm is more likely to procure
such a good on the open market.
The consequences of asset specificity on the issues of interpretation at issue
in this analysis are not entirely clear. It is safe to assume that if an asset is
highly specific, then issues of formal versus contextual adjudication are
unimportant because firms are likely to integrate and manage the transactions
internally. At low levels of asset specificity, where there is substantial resale
value of a good combined with non-negligible contractual risk, there may not
be enough incentive for vertical integration. If firms do not integrate, they must
decide on a dispute resolution mechanism for their market transactions. This
decision implicates the formal versus contextual question at issue in this
project.
A hypothesis of the model developed in this Article is that high contracting
costs are likely to result in preferences for more contextual types of
adjudication. The core intuition underlying this prediction is that transactors
will take their chances with the provisions a court or arbitrator will use to fill
gaps when it is prohibitively expensive to write reasonably complete contracts
that serve as a useful guide for interpretation. While the role of frequency and
uncertainty on the cost of contracting seem straightforward enough, it is less
clear whether asset specificity will have a predictable impact on the costs of
30. For an up-to-date treatment of asset specificity, and an empirical measurement of this variable,
see Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankruptcies,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 2310, 2330-38 (2005).
31. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43 J.L. &
ECON. 15 (2000); Benjamin Klein, Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, 43 J.L. &
ECON. 105 (2000).
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contracting. On one hand, the small-numbers bargaining situations that come
with asset specificity may mean that the market for norms is not sufficiently
liquid to assure that norms reflect efficient practices. Alternatively, the
transaction at issue may occur frequently enough to alleviate liquidity concerns.
What appears to drive the result, however, is frequency and uncertainty rather
than asset specificity per se.
D. Insularity
Where a community of transactors is relatively insular there may be
consequences for contracting and related dispute resolution decisions.
Insularity, which is largely a function of group size and the ability of the group
to convey reputational information, can make meaningful the threat of
ostracism for bad faith behavior. The analysis of insularity is generally absent
from discussions of vertical integration, but it is potentially important for
managing transactions that may result in litigation. An insular community of
transactors has an easier ability, all other things being equal, to impose costs on
non-cooperators through the use of reputational sanctions. Given the option of
imposing reputational sanctions on disreputable transactors, there may be an
incentive to minimize the role of formal written contracts and structured
dispute resolution.
In an insular network, social sanction could also be used in conjunction
with more formal types of dispute resolution. Indeed, Cooter and Porat have
explored one dimension of this type of hybrid by analyzing whether social
sanctions should affect the damage awards courts make. 32 They find that in
order to properly incentivize actors, courts should deduct non-legal sanctions
from damage awards to prevent over deterrence of valuable activities. 33 Cooter
and Porat take the court system as a given and do not analyze the potential for
transactors to opt out of public adjudication when non-legal sanctions are
effective within a community of transactors. Nevertheless, their insight is
useful in the commercial law context. A separate system of adjudication would
allow transactors to impose lower awards that may be cheaper to administer,
and yet, they would be just as effective if they prompted non-legal sanctions
within the community. For example, Lisa Bernstein finds that cotton traders
forego the expense associated with computing expectation and consequential
damages in favor of an under-compensatory market difference formula. 34 This
market difference formula, based on the difference between the contract price
and the market price at breach, is much cheaper to compute because it does not
32. See Robert D. Cooter & Ariel Porat, Should Courts Deduct Non-Legal Sanctions from
Damages?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (2001).
33. ld.at420-21.
34. See Bernstein, supra note 10, at 1733.
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entail the discovery necessary to determine lost profits and consequential
damages. Transactors can make up for the inexact contract damages by
imposing reputational sanctions on bad faith transactors.
Within an insular network of transactors, the availability of non-legal
sanctions to govern transactions may lead to a preference for more streamlined
types of adjudication. There is, however, at least one potentially mitigating
factor. The more thorough a system of dispute resolution is, the more
confidence one presumably can have in its findings. If an industry is insular
enough that reputation plays a large role, then there may be value to a thorough
system of dispute resolution because transactors can have more confidence in
any findings made during litigation. These findings, insofar as they reveal
truthful information about the parties' courses of dealing, would presumably
affect reputation in a way that benefits the community of transactors.
The role of insularity in deciding how to resolve disputed transactions will
turn on this tradeoff between cost-effective dispute resolution and the value of
reputational information that litigation reveals. This tradeoff invokes the
difference between observable versus verifiable information used by Bernstein
in a number of her studies. She defines observable information as "information
that it is both possible and worthwhile for transactors to obtain" and verifiable
information as "information that it is worthwhile for transactors to prove to a
designated third-party neutral in the event of a dispute." 35 She argues that
transactors will only allocate terms based on information that is both
observable and verifiable to written contracts and will leave other terms to
extralegal agreements.
36
If a particular industry involves a lot of information that is easy to observe
but difficult to verify, insularity should promote streamlined dispute resolution.
The reason for this preference is that the ability to observe information
promotes the use of reputation to ensure trustworthiness. The high expense
associated with verifying information, which is already known due to its ease
of observation, means that extensive and expensive litigation will produce little
or no useful information. Alternatively, where information is difficult to
observe, but relatively easy to verify, there may be a preference for more
thorough and contextual types of adjudication. For example, where firms
conduct research about safety tradeoffs, it may be difficult to observe safety
tradeoffs in the finished product but relatively easy to verify the tradeoff
decisions through the litigation discovery process. In general, as long as
information is observable, informal gossip networks should be sufficient to
cheaply supply reputation information. Where information is not observable
there may be value to an insular community having more intensive systems of
35. Bernstein, supra note 9, at 1792.
36. Id. at 1791-92.
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dispute resolution.
Recent work by Amitai Aviram analyzes the necessary conditions that
would permit insular groups of transactors to create self-sustaining private legal
systems ("PLSs"). Aviram contends that in order for a community to generate a
viable private system of legal governance there must be a set of low-cost norms
that reward participation in the emerging PLS.37 Private legal systems are
networks that increase the surplus of members by meting out penalties for those
who do not abide by the norms of the network. This penalty system allows for
commitments between members to be more credible because they are backed
by the formal and informal sanctions of the group. 38 Aviram argues that for
PLSs to form, they must begin by enforcing low-cost norms, otherwise people
would not choose to opt into the network because the costs of norm violation
outweigh the benefits of network membership. Once the network grows larger,
offering the members more benefits, the network can enforce more costly
norms, such as banishment from the network, in order to provide even greater
benefits to network members. 39 Aviram's work, like Bernstein's to some
degree, emphasizes the ability of an insular network to police the behavior of
members at a cost that is often below the use of more formal legal systems.
These insular networks can lower the cost of contracting by decreasing
expected dispute resolution costs. Of course, insular networks also facilitate
cartel behavior, particularly where the costs of exclusion are large. This tension
between economies of scale in contracting provided by groups and the dangers
of restricted output and barriers to entry posed by cartel behavior present an
interesting problem concerning the desirability of PLSs. The Hayekian tradition
of spontaneous private ordering celebrates decentralized decisions such as
those to form PLSs. 40 At the same time, the potential inefficiencies created by
cartel behavior may attenuate enthusiasm for these PLSs.
III. THENEW FORMALISM
This section reviews the work of the New Formalists with reference to the
framework set out above. This section begins with a discussion of Lisa
Bernstein's series of empirical studies that demonstrate a strong preference by
some groups of transactors for formal rules of contract interpretation that
deviate significantly from the contextualist framework supplied by Article 2. A
37. Amitai Aviram, A Paradox of Spontaneous Formation: The Evolution of Private Legal Systems,
22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. I, 19-22 (2004).
38. There is a wide ranging literature on the necessary conditions for supporting credible exchange.
See, e.g., Rachel E. Kranton, The Formation of Cooperative Relationships, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 214
(1996); Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom & Barry R. Weingast, Coordination, Commitment, and
Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild, 102 J. POL. ECON. 745 (1994); Oliver E. Williamson,
Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. EcON. REV. 519, 521 (1983).
39. Aviram, supra note 37, at 13.
40. See Friedrich Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcON. REV. 519 (1945).
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discussion of theoretical work that supports the New Formalism follows.
A. Bernstein's Empiricism
Lisa Bernstein has studied three industries that have opted out of the public
legal system by setting up industry-specific dispute resolution systems. The
central theme of this work, which Jason Johnston has termed the "Bernstein
Conjecture," speculates that the legal rules reflecting commercial reality can
undermine the flexible commercial norms and practices that these rules seek to
promote. 41 This section reviews the substantial depth in her studies of the
diamond, grain, and cotton industries with a specific focus on what these works
say about the attributes of the underlying transactions and the relationship of
those attributes to the dispute resolution systems established by these
industries.
1. The Diamond Industry
Bernstein's first major empirical study surveyed the dispute resolution
practices of the diamond industry. One primary observation was the strong
preference among diamond industry members for private governance of
contracts rather than adjudication in public courts. The diamond industry's
dispute resolution system combines mechanisms such as reputation bonds,
customary business norms, and a private arbitration system with its own rules
and means of enforcement. Bernstein attempts to explain this preference by
focusing on the institutional features of the diamond industry that make
conventional adjudication unattractive. In particular, diamond dealers appear to
prefer arbitration because it is quicker, less expensive, and more secret thanS • 42
conventional adjudication.
While Bernstein did not significantly engage questions of formal versus
contextual interpretation until her 1996 article on NGFA, her study of diamond
dealers does provide enough information to discuss both the attributes of the
transaction and the interpretational preferences of the transactors. Bernstein
centers her study on the New York Diamond Dealers Club ("the Club"). The
Club is a bourse for both rough uncut diamonds and polished stones. About
eighty percent of the rough cut diamonds coming into the United States at some
point pass through the hands of a Club member as do twenty to fifty percent of
the polished stones. 43 When Bernstein published her study, the Club had
41. See Jason Scott Johnston, Should the Law Ignore Commercial Norms? A Comment on the
Bernstein Conjecture and its Relevance for Contract Law Theory and Reform, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1791
(2001).
42. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 148 (1992).
43. Id. at 119.
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roughly 2,000 members.4 4
While Bernstein does not provide exact numbers, it is clear that a large
number of transactions take place between Club members. The relatively small
group of members combined with large number of transactions ensures
relatively high amounts of global frequency, firm-specific frequency, and
partner-specific frequency.45 As one would expect with high levels of all types
of frequencies there is a firmly established set of trade norms, some of which
the Club has codified and others of which are "generally known and
accepted. ' ' 46 This high level of frequency means that there will be significant
economies of scale for contract drafting. These savings from the drafting
economies will turn, at least to some degree, on how certain or uncertain the
underlying diamond transactions are.
Bernstein explains that the diamond industry is seasonal. This structural
feature requires buyers to purchase relatively large quantities of uncut
diamonds in short periods of time. These large purchases necessitate access to
credit and also mean that simultaneous exchanges without executory
agreements are not always feasible. 47 This need for contracts also means that
there is a need for dispute resolution, and the Club mandates that all members
48
submit any dispute to the Club's own arbitration system. Bernstein reports
that approximately 150 cases go to arbitration annually and roughly 85% of
these cases settle.
She puts the cases that do not settle into three general categories-(1) cases
with explicit remedies in the trade rules; (2) cases without explicit remedies but
that are well-known and consistent norms for deciding the cases; and (3)
complex cases that arbitrators "either decline to hear or decide in accordance
with rules of decision and damage measures that neither party can predict ex
ante.",49 Bernstein does not provide a distribution of the number of cases falling
into each category. She does, however, note that the decisions of the arbitrators
in the third category have an ad hoc nature and seem to be decided on the basis
of "trade custom and usage, a little common sense, some Jewish law, and, last,
common-law legal principles." 50 Bernstein claims that the diamond dealers
complained about the lack of standards in the third category of cases. She
supports this claim by noting that the arbitrators do not issue formal findings
and that there are no rules to guide damage awards.
51
44. Id.
45. Most dealers transact by themselves, meaning that firm-specific frequency refers to how often
any one dealer engages in diamond transactions.
46. Id. at 126.
47. Id. at 130.
48. Id. at 124-25.
49. Id. at 126.
50. Id. at 127. For a further discussion on the ad hoc nature of arbitration see infra Section V(B).
51. Id.
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The fact that there are cases in the third category speaks to some degree of
uncertainty in diamond transactions. Apparently the codified trade rules, trade
norms, and the written contracts underlying the transactions do not address the
circumstances that arise in these complex disputes. Without enumerating the
number of cases of this type she does suggest that the cases that do not settle
come predominantly from the third category. The ad hoc nature of the standard
used to decide cases in this third category implies that there is uncertainty both
with respect to the types of disputes that may arise and uncertainty with respect
to how the arbitration board may decide these cases. The ad hoc standard also
demonstrates that there is not a strict preference for the formal types of
interpretation that Bernstein finds in her other studies of dispute resolution. The
preference for more contextual types of adjudication supports one of the
predictions that comes out of the transactional paradigm used in this project.
Namely, that where there is uncertainty with respect to the circumstances or
interpretation of a transaction there will be less of a preference for formal types
of adjudication.
2. The National Grain and Feed Association
In her NGFA study, Bernstein finds hostility to some of the more
contextual provisions of Article 2, such as those using evidence of course of
performance, course of dealing, and trade norms to fill gaps in contracts. She
not only documents the preference for formal interpretation, but she provides a
theory of why the strict, arms-length provisions embodied in both the contracts
governing grain transactions and the rules guiding the interpretation of these
contracts deviate from the informal, almost blas&, interactions that typify
relationships between grain dealers.
She posits that grain dealers and merchants operate under two sets of norms
when dealing with one another. Relationship preserving norms (RPNs) reflect
the practices of transactors who expect to continually deal with one another.
These practices allow conduct that differs from the formal terms typically
found in grain contracts. For example, grain merchants will often use each
others' unsupervised weights to avoid the high cost of official weights even
though grain contracts usually contain clauses requiring the use of official
weights. 52 She theorizes that the arms-length terms in grain contracts reflect
end game norms (EGNs), which transactors use when a relationship sours. She
argues that transactors understand the difference between RPNs and EGNs and
allocate governance of their trading relationships in a way that maximizes the
value of the transaction.
53
Bernstein argues that the formal adjudication system of NGFA embodies
52. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 1799.
53. Id. at 1789.
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the desire of grain merchants to have contracts interpreted strictly according to
the EGNs contained in the contracts. While Bernstein may overstate this
claim, 54 there does seem to be an aversion on the part of grain merchants to
more contextual types of adjudication. The model developed in this Article
suggests that this preference is a product of the attributes of grain transactions.
In particular, the grain transactions carried out by NGFA transactors are high in
frequency and low in uncertainty making them ideal candidates for formal
modes of adjudication.
The grain transactions studied by Bernstein appear to be high on all levels
of frequency. NGFA is made up of over 1,000 firms who handle over two-
thirds of the U.S. grains used in domestic and international markets. 55 This
high level of frequency is almost certainly adequate to ensure enough
transactions to support the generation of efficient norms and large economies of
scale for contracting costs. This wide coverage of the grain markets means that
the NGFA trade rules and arbitration system, which all members must abide by
as a condition of membership, reflect a large number of transactions. NGFA
has a series of trade rules to govern different industries within the grain and
feed trade. The oldest of these sets of rules was promulgated in 1902 and the
rules are regularly updated to reflect both changing business practices and the
additional learning.
56
With respect to uncertainty, Bernstein notes that "[o]ne of the main reasons
that a formalistic approach is well-suited to NGFA's adjudication of disputes is
that the types of events that can disrupt a grain or feed transaction are, except in
highly unusual circumstances, known by transactors at the time of
contracting." 57 This low level of uncertainty means that it is possible to write
nearly complete contracts. The high frequency of grain transactions also
assures that there are economies of scale to drafting these contracts. These twin
features of high frequency and low uncertainty mean that the costs associated
with drafting contracts are likely to be quite low. Given the low costs for
54. For example, she writes in a footnote: "There are a few cases where the language of the
decision suggests that the arbitrators are ruling on the basis of custom. However, a closer look at the
facts of these cases reveals that the same results could easily have been reached on the basis of the trade
rules alone." Id. at 1778 n. 46. This language suggests that some of the arbitrators she investigates may
not take as formal an approach as she suggests. She argues that one could reach these outcomes on the
basis of trade rules; however this is her interpretation, and not that of the actual arbitrators.
Cases published since Bemstein conducted her study display a more contextual approach than those
cited in her article. For example, in one case the NGFA arbitrators ignored the requirement that a
modification be in writing because it was a trade norm to agree to modifications orally: "Although
Tommy Farms did not issue a written confirmation of the contract change as required under 'Old Grain
Trade Rule 41' [current Grain Trade Rule 4], the arbitrators determined that it was the custom of the
trade that producers do not write contracts or contract amendments, but only receive and sign written
confirmations sent by grain companies." NGFA Arbitration Case Number 2002, available at
http://www.ngfa.org/article.asparticle_id= 1890 (emphasis added).
55. See http://www.ngfa.org/ngfaprofile.asp.
56. See http://www.ngfa.org/trexplan.asp.
57. Bernstein, supra note 9, at 1816.
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drafting relatively complete contracts it is not surprising that NGFA transactors
appear to have a preference for formal adjudication that facilitates enforcing the
strict terms of the contracts. The experience reflected in the form contracts
means that adjudicators should defer to clauses that limit the amount of
contextual evidence such as no oral modification clauses, limitations on the use
of course of performance and dealing, and trade norms contrary to the black
letter contract.
3. The Cotton Industry
Bernstein has also studied the cotton industry's system of adjudication. 58
This study, like her NGFA research, found a relatively tightly knit group of
transactors using a mixture of formal legal rules and extralegal reputational
sanctions to govern transactions. The cotton industry has a longstanding and
independent system of dispute resolution that favors relatively formal rules.
Bernstein notes that the trade rules largely contain "bright-line" rules rather
than standards that require reasonable behavior by transactors. 59 In addition,
the cotton arbitration rules specify under-compensatory market damages rather
than fully compensatory expectation damages. This measure of damages
streamlines the dispute adjudication process because it limits the amount of
discovery, while also protecting sensitive private information. 60
Like the diamond and grain industries studied by Bernstein, the attributes of
the transaction are well suited to formal modes of dispute resolution. With
respect to frequency, Bernstein describes the cotton market she studies as
having a "high velocity" of transactions. 61 This high frequency of transactions
means that conditions support efficient trade norms and that there are
economies to drafting standard form contracts. Unsurprisingly, Bernstein
reports that the cotton industry makes widespread use of form contracts and has
also codified trade norms to increase the certainty in dispute resolution.
As one would expect in an industry that uses a highly formalistic dispute
resolution system, there are relatively low amounts of uncertainty surrounding
cotton transactions. A primary cause of breach in the cotton industry is
shortages due to unfavorable weather. This situation is not infrequent and most
transactors have established methods of accommodating weather-related delay.
It is relatively easy to describe the causes of shortages and, thus, there is little
uncertainty with respect to the difficulty in describing possible states of the
world. Moreover, the formalistic dispute resolution system of the cotton
industry ensures that adjudicative outcomes are relatively easy to predict.
58. See Bernstein, supra note 10.
59. Id. at 1732-33.
60. Id. at 1733.
61. Id. at 1755.
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Bernstein places much of her focus on the ability of cotton transactors to
use reputational sanctions against dealers perceived as unscrupulous or
untrustworthy. It makes sense that if cotton transactors can use relatively cheap
and effective reputational sanctions to punish suspect dealers, then there would
be little interest in the added expense of contextual types of adjudication. The
efficacy of these reputational sanctions depends, at least in part, on the
insularity of the community of transactors. Insularity will usually mean that
information travels quickly. Indeed, Bernstein reports that the cotton industry
has vibrant gossip networks that expeditiously convey reputational information
about dealers.
Close-knit communities may or may not have to rely on exclusionary
sanctions to punish members who deal with those excluded from the group. If a
particular dealer gains a reputation for being untrustworthy, then transactors are
merely looking after their own self-interest by refusing to deal with the
supposedly untrustworthy transactor. Alternatively, if a transactor gains an
unfavorable reputation for undercutting an agreement that is in restraint of trade
then it may take policing efforts by the group to exclude the blighted transactor
from business dealings. The simple reason for policing is that it may be in the
interest of group members to clandestinely transact with the cartel violator.
Thus to maintain any agreement in restraint of trade, the group may also need
to punish through exclusion members transacting with other group members
who violate cartel agreements.
Bernstein reports that the rules of dispute resolution in the cotton industry
require that party names be redacted out of published opinions. This method
contrasts with the NGFA arbitration system where party names are published in
opinions. Bernstein explains this cotton industry practice as a means of
minimizing the reputational damage to a seller. The tight networks between
cotton dealers ensure that gossip will let insiders know of any misdealings by
other insiders. However, outsiders are not privy to this gossip network, and thus
will not learn the identity of insiders who are on the losing end of dispute
resolution.
4. Review
This section demonstrates that the industries Bernstein studies share a
number of attributes. The transactions in these industries tend to be high
frequency, low uncertainty, and take place in the context of high insularity.
These attributes are particularly amenable to the formal types of interpretation
that Bernstein argues these industries prefer. One reason for this preference is
that in transactions with these attributes one can draft a relatively complete
contract at low expense. Where contracts are complete, the argument for black
letter adjudication is strong. Bernstein's theory speculating that transactors
differentiate between RPNs and EGNs surely has some validity in the context
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of frequent certain transactions among insular groups. However, where the
transactional attributes differ, particularly with regard to those variables that
increase the cost of contracting, it is by no means clear that formal methods of
interpretation suit these relatively incomplete contracts.
B. The Theory of the New Formalism
A group of theorists have sought to justify the New Formalism through an
analysis of the potential of more formal contract interpretation to enhance the
joint surplus, and hence the efficiency, of contracts. A primary figure in this
emerging literature is Omri Ben-Shahar, who has authored two important
articles in this area. Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott also have authored a
foundational work on this topic.
62
Ben-Shahar's, The Erosion of Rights by Past Breach, a more theoretical
piece, analyzes the countervailing effects of erosion doctrines, such as adverse
possession, laches, and course of performance. 63 Ben-Shahar demonstrates that,
under certain assumptions, the effect of an erosion doctrine is exactly cancelled
out by the attendant effect on the credibility of a threat to sue. This claim is
tantamount to saying that the scope of an erosion doctrine is irrelevant because,
no matter the circumstances, the credibility of the threat to sue will increase or
decrease at a level that exactly matches the scope of the erosion doctrine. 64 So,
for example, an increase in the ability for a buyer to successfully claim that a
seller has waived its rights under a contract will result in a proportional
increase in the seller's ability to credibly threaten a lawsuit. Ben-Shahar's aim,
however, is not to argue that erosion doctrines are irrelevant. Rather, his aim is
to place the focus on the way transaction costs affect erosion doctrines.
In an informal exposition of his claim, Ben-Shahar compares a "fixed
rights" regime, where rights do not erode, to an "eroding rights" regime, where
rights can erode under certain conditions. In the examples of adverse
possession and laches, rights erode through the passage of time. Under the
doctrine of course of performance, a right can erode when one party allows the
other party to act in violation of a contract without objection or penalty; so, if a
buyer and seller agree to use unofficial weights to verify quantities despite a
contract clause that provides for official weights, that behavior can erode the
ability to enforce the contractual right. Ben-Shahar shows that when
enforcement costs are the same, the values of exchange are exactly equal in
both a fixed rights regime-which would not allow practice to erode contract
rights-and in an erosion regime that allows practice to alter contractual
62. See Alan Schwartz & Robert Scott, supra note 13.
63. Omri Ben-Shahar, The Erosion of Rights by Past Breach, I AM. L. & ECON. REV. 190 (1999).
64. Id. at 193-94.
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rights.65 Put another way, the social surplus from exchange is invariant to
erosion rules as long as enforcement costs are the same across these rules.
To demonstrate this concept, Ben-Shahar develops a two-period contract
delivery model that contrasts behavior under a fixed-rights regime and behavior
under an erosion regime. In the fixed-rights example, he shows that an
opportunistic promisor will make a delivery equal to the contracted for value
minus the cost of enforcement. 66 While in an erosion-rights regime the
promisee will require a higher value of delivery in the first round of the
exchange due to the fear that refusing to enforce his right will permit the
promisor to deliver a lesser amount in the second round. Ben-Shahar, however,
shows that the total value of the period one and period two deliveries is the
same under both regimes. 67 Ben-Shahar then demonstrates that this irrelevance
effect holds under different types of erosion rules, 68 under multi-period
exchanges, 69 and when litigation costs differ between parties.
70
Ben-Shahar notes that while erosion regimes are irrelevant under an
assumption of zero transaction costs, in reality transaction costs are never zero.
He analogizes to the Coase Theorem in pointing out that his irrelevance
theorem demonstrates that transaction costs determine the optimality of erosion
doctrines. 7 1 He speculates that different erosion regimes could have varying
endogenous effects on litigation costs. For example, one may be able to
economize on litigation costs by initiating a consolidated case for multiple
violations in a fixed rights regime, whereas an eroding rights regime may
require discrete cases for every violation because one unlitigated claim could
be sufficient to destroy the ability to enforce a contractual right. In another
example, which bears on the formalism/contextualism question, different
erosion rules may impose vastly different monitoring costs on transactions. The
danger of high monitoring costs is particularly acute with erosion rules such as
course of performance. Because accepting non-conforming performance
65. Id. at 207.
66. In his example he sets the contracted delivery at one-hundred and the cost of enforcement at
thirty. In this situation an opportunistic promisor will deliver seventy to the promisee because the
promisee has no incentive to initiate suit under these circumstances. Id. at 203-04.
67. These are the details of Ben-Shahar's example: a promisee contracts for two periods of delivery
of one-hundred from a promisor. Under the fixed rights regime the promisor is held to a delivery of one-
hundred and under an erosion rights regime the promisor must deliver the value delivered in the
previous round, provided that the promisee did not enforce the stipulated value of one-hundred. In the
fixed rights regime an opportunistic promisor will deliver seventy, the lowest amount he can deliver
without inducing enforcement by the promisee (see previous footnote for a more complete explanation
of this phenomenon). In an erosion rights regime the promisor will deliver eighty-five in the first round,
which becomes the course of performance. In the second round the promisor will deliver fifty-five,
which is the course of performance minus the cost of enforcement. In both cases the sum total of the
exchange is one-hundred-and-forty.
68. ld.at208-10.
69. Id. at 210-12.
70. Id. at 212-14.
71. 1d. at216.
Vol. 6.1, 2009
HeinOnline  -- 6 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 22 2009
Interpretive Preferences and the Limits of the New Formalism
without objecting may erode the ability to enforce a contractual right, this
erosion rule may significantly burden an organization by imposing the large
monitoring costs that are necessary to ensure compliance with the written terms
of a contract.
In The Tentative Case Against Flexibility, Ben-Shahar develops his
irrelevance insight. He critiques the theoretical assertions of Bernstein and also
explores the pragmatic implications of his theory for the contextual rules of the
UCC. For the purposes of exposition, Ben-Shahar begins with the assumption
that the UCC often permits past practices to alter explicit contract terms
through rules such as the parol evidence rule, course of performance, and
course of dealing. 72 These erosion doctrines can lead to more rigid behavior by
contractors, because, he speculates, one party may be amenable to a one-time
price adjustment, but will refuse to change the contract price for fear that an
alteration would be binding on future conduct. Ben-Shahar then applies his
irrelevance doctrine to these rules and argues that while more flexible rules can
lead to more rigid behavior, the underlying value of a contract is the same
under rules that provide for different levels of flexibility. 73 He uses this insight
to argue that the framers of the UCC ignored the rigidity effect while also
maintaining that Bernstein ignores that the contextual rules of the UCC can
promote welfare-enhancing change by accommodating the dynamic needs of
transactors. 
74
This irrelevance proposition, however, cannot account for the preferences
that many transactors have for certain terms that often appear in real-world
contracts. For example, Ben-Shahar notes that the presence of no-waiver
clauses does not make much sense if, as he assumes, courts will ignore such a
clause when interpreting a contract under the UCC. If courts will not respect
such clauses, why would parties waste the resources necessary to draft and
bargain over such terms? 75 Ben-Shahar's answer is that ancillary costs
associated with different rules will make some rules more preferable than
76
others.
Ben-Shahar's analysis of these ancillary costs begins with the possible
economization of litigation expenses in a non-erosion regime. Under a non-
erosion rule one can let violations of explicit contract terms accrue and then
bring one suit to enforce the contractual right, but under an erosion rule one
may need to bring a separate suit for every deviation from the explicit
contractual terms. Ben-Shahar notes, however, that under most versions of the
72. Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 781, 789-92
(1999).
73. Id. at 802.
74. Id. at 795.
75. Id. at 806.
76. Id. at 809.
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UCC one need not initiate a full-fledged lawsuit to prevent erosion of a given
right. Instead, a party can merely register a complaint about the performance,
which is far cheaper than initiating a lawsuit over every instance of behavior
that deviates from the explicit terms of a contract. Given the potential for cheap
protest, Ben-Shahar does not make an argument either way with respect to
retrospective suits. His conclusion, which seems appropriate, is that the
enforcement costs under the UCC are not high enough to discredit the flexible
course of performance and waiver provisions.
Like Bernstein, Ben-Shahar also identifies potentially high monitoring costs
as a potential source of waste under flexible rules. 77 For example, if it is
difficult for a buyer to detect whether a given set of goods or services is
conforming, flexible rules may heighten the rigidity effect. This increase in
rigidity would result from the fear of allowing a contractual right to erode if the
goods are actually nonconforming. This fear-at least under the strong form of
the rule that requires a lawsuit to preserve contractual rights-would lead to an
increased propensity to sue in order to keep the right from eroding. The
problem of high monitoring costs is particularly acute in the context of course
of performance rules. The prospect of losing a contractual right due to
acceptance of non-conforming performance puts a buyer to the choice of
investing in monitoring costs to ensure conforming tender or investing in
litigation to keep contractual rights from eroding. For a large organization
involved in many transactions, the cost of monitoring may be quite large,
especially in the face of a very flexible rule that erodes a contractual right when
there is one instance of accepting non-conforming tender. Such an organization
may be better served by developing a reputation for pursuing litigation when
performance may not be conforming rather than paying the monitoring costs
necessary to properly protest any case of non-conforming tender. It is
important, however, to remember that the increase in the rigidity effect will
largely be a function of how easily a rule permits waiver, course of
performance, or any similar rule to abrogate a contractual right based on
contrary conduct.
Ben-Shahar also identifies three other factors that, all other things being
equal, may undermine arguments for flexible erosion rules. He first argues that
random errors in adjudication will be more costly under erosion regimes than
under non-erosion regimes. The basis for this argument is quite simple-under
a non-erosion regime a court need only make factual determinations about the
"the magnitude of breach or to aggregate the cumulative cost of a sequence of
breaches."78 Alternatively, under an erosion regime a court must make legal
determinations in addition to the factual determinations required under a non-
77. Id. at 811-12.
78. Id. at 814.
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erosion regime. These legal determinations include the degree to which non-
conforming performance erodes the right to enforce the written contract. An
error in such a legal determination could have costly consequences for a party.
If an error results in the unexpected erosion of a contractual right, there is a
potentially substantial cost to erosion regimes because they can destroy or
undermine highly valued rights.
These points about adjudication errors are important, but there are at least
two rejoinders to this claim. First, this effect is not an inherent liability of
erosion rules, but rather is a secondary effect of an imprecise legal system. In
any system of adjudication some amount of error is unavoidable, but insofar as
a legal system minimizes inaccuracy the relative costs imposed by the
imprecise application of erosion rules may not be substantial.79 Second, as with
the case of monitoring costs, the case against flexible rules based on errors in
adjudication depends on how flexible the rule is. Under an extreme erosion rule
that erodes rights when there are only a small number of non-conforming
tenders, the potential waste from random errors in judgment is high. The UCC,
however, places a priority on the express terms of the agreement and uses
course of performance primarily as an aid to interpretation. 80 While some claim
that courts are too willing to overlook express language, the text of the UCC
contains a minimal erosion rule, which means that relatively small random
errors will only make large legal differences at the margin. 81
If, for example, a firm repeatedly accepts non-conforming tender, a court
may erroneously construe this behavior as a pattern and choose to abrogate the
firm's contractual rights. Where, however, there are only a small number of
isolated incidents of the firm accepting non-conforming tender, it would take a
very large error for there to be any erosion of rights when a rule requires a
discernable pattern of behavior. In contrast, the cost associated with errors
under a formalistic, non-erosion regime will always be substantial. If a court
finds that a particular performance is not conforming then the non-conforming
party is in breach of the written contract. For a court system prone to error,
under a non-erosion regime courts will sometimes find a party in breach even
79. Appellate courts have the potential to increase accuracy, and hence diminish the costs imposed
by the imprecise application of erosion rules, but the need for appellate courts to play this role may drive
up the costs of litigation associated with erosion regimes.
80. See U.C.C. § 2-108(2) (emphasis added):
"The express terms of the agreement and any such course of performance, as well as any
course of dealing and usage of trade, shall be construed whenever reasonable as consistent
with each other; but when such construction is unreasonable, express terms shall control
course of performance and course of performance shall control both course of dealing and
usage of trade."
81. See, e.g., Schwartz and Scott, supra note 13, at 585-603 (discussing cases where courts
disregard express contractual language in favor of UCC defaults); JOHN J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 38 (4th ed., 1995) ("[lI]f, in light of a 'relevant' course of
performance, either waiver or a modification .... is thus shown, courts sometimes say that course of
performance 'controls' and thus alters the express terms.").
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when they adhered to the terms of a contract. In comparison to a contextual rule
that requires a clear pattern of behavior before a right erodes, it is by no means
clear that a non-erosion rule is less costly when the legal system is prone to
error.
The second factor that Ben-Shahar points to as favoring formal rules is the
differing cost of breach under formal and flexible regimes. He argues that
formal rules may promote more flexibility in commercial relationships because
transactors know that they are not giving up any contractual rights when they
accept non-conforming performance-an effect that keeps the cost of breach
low. Supposing that the cost of accepting non-conforming performance is
negligible, Ben-Shahar argues that under a formal regime, transactors should
not be concerned about non-conforming tender because they do not lose any
contractual rights through acceptance. Under erosion rules, in contrast,
transactors may be more vigilant about requiring to-the-letter performance out
of fear of losing their contractual rights. While an individual instance of non-
conforming tender may only impose negligible costs, the accelerated loss of the
contractual right that attaches to this acceptance may impose a much more
substantial cost.
The third factor discussed by Ben-Shahar incorporates reliance concerns
into the cost of breach. Under an erosion regime a transactor can, somewhat
comfortably, rely on a promisee's acceptance of non-conforming tender. If the
promisee's acceptance becomes regular enough to abrogate the right to enforce
the written contract, then a promisor need not worry about being in breach as
she continues her non-conforming performance. Alternatively, under a formal
regime a promisor can never rely on the acceptance of non-conforming tender
because a promisee can always claim breach.82
Comfortable reliance, Ben-Shahar notes, is one of the more compelling
rationales for flexible erosion regimes. Ben-Shahar does, however, register two
objections to this reasoning. First, he contends that erosion rules can induce
reliance on non-conforming practices that may not otherwise exist under more
formal rules. He writes, "While the need to accommodate actions made in
reliance on a conflicting practice is one of the principal reasons to prefer a
flexible legal regime over a rigid one, the mere implementation of such a
flexible regime gives rise to reliance actions that might otherwise not take
place." 83 It is not clear, however, why this possibility should be considered
troubling. If a promisee acquiesces to non-conforming performance with the
full knowledge that she is giving up the underlying contractual right, there is no
prima facie reason to suppose that this action creates an efficiency loss. This
particular argument appears to be based on an aesthetic objection against
82. This analysis obviously ignores statute of limitations concerns.
83. Ben-Shahar,supra note 72, at 817.
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contextual rules rather than an instrumental rationale in favor of more formal
regimes.
Ben-Shahar concedes that reliance may not solely be the product of rules
that permit for erosion. Instead, "[a] myopic party may rely on a conflicting
practice, such as price reduction or late tender, not for the purpose of modifying
the contract prospectively in a manner favorable to herself, but out of sincere
belief that the practice reflects a status quo." 84 Ben-Shahar then argues that this
reliance should only be promoted if it is wealth enhancing rather than merely
value transferring. This statement is correct; however, he does not offer any
analysis to suggest one way or the other if such reliance is likely to result only
in rent-seeking. Moreover, the use of the word "myopic" suggests a larger
issue. The implication would seem to be that if transactors were more far-
sighted they would be reticent to permit waiver or reliance. This position,
however, does not seem to acknowledge legitimate uncertainty as to the terms
of an agreement. 85 A review of contract disputes shows that large gaps, and
hence uncertainty as to contractual rights, can often exist with respect to such
basic terms as price and quantity. The next section argues that the fact that
contracts have gaps that would be costly to fill has important consequences for
the desirability of formal versus contextual regimes of interpretation.
Scott and Schwartz have also developed an important theoretical defense of
formal contract interpretation. Though their wide ranging theory would require
much space to explain in detail, it is worth noting several of the important
points they make about the likely preferences of commercial transactors. First,
Schwartz and Scott argue forcefully against the application of mandatory rules
such as prohibitions against penalties, required acceptance of substantial
performance, and an inability to ban contract modifications when parties have
expressly contracted around these rules. 86 This point does not conflict with the
theory I articulate in this article because where the costs of contracting justify
the inclusion of an express term in a contract, it is likely that this term enhances
the expected surplus of the exchange and, thus, should be enforced absent a
compelling reason otherwise.
87
Second, Schwartz and Scott contend that commercial parties are likely to
prefer formal interpretation because, as long as errors have a mean of zero
(meaning that courts get the right answer on average), contextual interpretation
84. Id.
85. In high certainty contracts-such as the NGFA examples provided by Bernstein- there is an
understandable reticence to be governed by contextual rules. In cases of low certainty contracts,
however, the transactors may learn more about the nature of the agreement as performance takes place.
Some have argued that tribunals that acknowledge the dynamic nature of the contract may be desirable
for this reason. Cf. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1743 (2000) (making normative and positive claims about the appeal of dynamic contract law).
86. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 13, at 611-18.
87. See infra Sec. Ill.
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tends to increase dispute resolution costs without a corresponding benefit.
88
This is an important observation, but much depends on the assumption that
courts will get things right on average. Insofar as this is not the case, one
should expect to see a preference by at least some parties for more contextual
types of interpretation if contextual interpretation produces accuracy in a
manner that enhances surplus. It is also worth noting that parties often devote
immense resources to litigation, which implies that parties may value accuracy
more than Schwartz and Scott suggest.
Finally, the actual dispute resolution choices of some transactors seem at
odds with the hypothesis of Schwartz and Scott. Many transactors undoubtedly
prefer highly formal types of interpretation, and they likely do so for the precise
reasons that Schwartz and Scott suggest-but by no means do all of them
exhibit this preference. The apparent desire of some transactors to have their
contracts governed by contextual rules suggests that the theory of the New
Formalism has yet to provide a global explanation for dispute resolution
preferences. 89 The ensuing section speculates about some of the reasons why
this variation may exist.
IV. TRANSACTIONAL ATTRIBUTES, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, AND
A MODEL OF GAP FILLING
This section develops a framework for analyzing how the attributes of a
transaction, which were identified in Section II, may affect the choice of how
much to invest in contract drafting. The framework begins with a model of the
marginal cost of additional investment in drafting before focusing on how
individual attributes would be likely to affect the developed model. This section
concludes with a series of applied examples from industries that appear to
prefer more contextual interpretation for the reasons suggested by the model.
A. Contracting Costs and the Dispute Resolution Decision
In the traditional transaction-cost model, contractual risk increases the
probability of vertical integration. The rationale for this prediction is that
vertical integration attenuates the risk of some transactions because bringing
the transaction within an organization eliminates the possibility of contractual
88. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 13, at 573-83 (noting that varying the assumptions can
change this analysis).
89. Schwartz and Scott do acknowledge that high-stakes transactions may create a preference for
contextual interpretation, particularly where the viability of a firm may depend on an accurate
interpretation of the contract. Id. at 576-77 ("If contextualists are correct that larger evidentiary bases do
shrink variance, then parties concerned with variance will likely prefer that courts use a contextualist
adjudicatory style.") The authors assert, however, that "only unusual contracts have this 'bet the ranch'
quality" without providing any support for this claim about the distribution of sensitivity with regard to
variance.
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opportunism and attenuates the risk associated with bounded rationality.
Vertical integration is, however, a rather costly solution to the problem of
contractual risk. If the amount at stake and the risk associated with a particular
transaction do not justify the cost associated with providing a good or service
in-house, transactors will have to use a contractual mechanism to support the
exchange. The contracting costs that can create the pressure to vertically
integrate are also a factor in the decision concerning the interpretive regime that
transactors use. The New Institutional Economics literature tends to focus on
the organizational aspects of contracting decisions, 90 while the economic
theory literature focuses on the information, bargaining, and remedy problems
presented by contracting decisions. 9 1 There have, however, been some recent
investigations by economists into how drafting costs can affect contractual
completeness. These analyses tend to focus on how exogenous factors impact
completeness without a focus on the interpretive prcfcrences these exogenous
factors may support. 92
The choice of whether or not to invest additional resources in ex ante
contracting is relatively simple. 93 One should continue to invest in contracting
if the cost of doing so is less than or equal to the expected costs and benefits of
the marginal cost of the investment. 94 There are two types of costs and benefits
to a contract term. The first type of benefit is the surplus that the term creates
for the parties to the contract. For example, a term specifying that the promisor
will expend a certain level of effort can create added value in the contract to the
promissee. Likewise, a deposit clause can serve as a means for a promisor to
recoup asset-specific investments. The second type of costs or benefits
concerns the marginal effect of a contract term on potential disputes. A
potential dispute involves the possible liability or award and the legal costs
associated with the dispute multiplied by the probability of a dispute. For
90. See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrbm & John Roberts, The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited, 12 J. OF
ECON. PERSP. 72 (1998); Joel M. Podolny & Karen L. Page, Network Forms of Organization, 24 ANN.
REV. OF Soc. 57 (1998).
91. See, e.g., Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and
Optimal Investment, 86 AMER. ECON. REV. 478 (1996); Paul L. Joskow, Contract Duration &
Relationship-Specific Investment, 77 AMER. ECON. REV. 168 (1987).
92. See Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, Rigidity, Discretion, and the Costs of Writing
Contracts, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 798 (2002).
93. Investing in contracting can take a number of forms. It can mean additional negotiations with
parties to fill in gaps, adding additional terms, modifying existing terms and the like. It is an open
question whether the length of contracts is a useful proxy for the degree of contractual investment. Cf
Robert D. Cooter and Thomas Ginsburg, Leximetrics: Why the Same Laws are Longer in Some
Countries than Others, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=456520.
94. Clayton Gillette has suggested that the costs of contracting bear on the analysis of interpretive
preferences. See Clayton P. Gillette, The Law Merchant in the Modern Age: Institutional Design and
International Usages under the CISG, 5 CHI. J. INTL. L. 157 (2004). He calls the expense of drafting
more complete contracts "specification costs" and argues that there may be situations where these
specification costs can outweigh the error and adjudication costs imposed by more contextual regimes.
Id. at 164. He does not, however, use a formal model or specify how attributes of transactions may affect
these relative costs. For further discussion of Gillette's work see infra notes 151 & 167.
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example, a term that specifies the meaning of a particular trade usage may
decrease the probability of a dispute.
The simple equation below depicts these elements of the contractual
completeness decision. Assume a bilateral contracting situation in a
competitive market where the goals of the parties are to minimize contracting
costs while maximizing joint surplus and minimizing dispute resolution costs.
In addition, assume that the parties, by pursing their own interests, will
maximize the overall surplus from the transaction. 95 Let
w cost per unit of contracting
x = quantity of contracting units
s(x) = expected surplus of as a function of contractual completeness,
assume: s'(x) > 0, s"(x) < 0
p(x) = probability of a dispute given x units
c = cost of resolving the dispute
() wx = s(x) -p(x)c
(2) w = s'(x) -p'(x)c
Equation (1) specifies the costs and benefits associated with deciding how
complete a contract should be. 96 The wx term is a measure of how much parties
invest in the contracting decision. The right hand side of the equation breaks
down the costs and benefits associated with the completeness of the contract.
The s(x) term measures the surplus from the contract as a function of the
number of contracting units. The p(x)c term measures the expected cost of
litigation as a function of contractual completeness. Note that this term does not
include a damage award because the damage award is merely a transfer
between the parties. 97 Equation (2) is the derivative of equation (1) with respect
to x. Equation (2) demonstrates that whenever the cost of negotiating the
marginal term in a contract is more than the expected surplus from the
transaction and more than the marginal effect of the transaction on liability, one
should not expect to see the term. 98 In contrast, whenever the cost of
95. This assumption rules out a situation, such as that posited by Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner,
where a party can strategically withhold information to increase her share of the pie at the expense of the
overall size of the pie. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 94 (1989).
96. Richard Posner develops a somewhat similar model in his investigation of the economics of
contract interpretation. His model, which focuses on the overall social efficiency of interpretive choices
rather than on variation in interpretive preferences, includes the cost to the judicial system of litigating a
dispute and an error term. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation,
83 TEX. L. REV. 1581 (2005). The cost to the judicial system is not relevant to the model developed here
because it is not a consideration of the parties. The model here incorporates the error term into the
expected surplus function.
97. Omitting the damage term makes sense where parties have similar expectations about the
probability of being sued or suing.
98. The surplus term assumes that whenever a term creates a net gain, that the parties will realize
this gain. In an actual bargaining context one assumes that the most common mechanism for ensuring
that parties will realize the complete surplus from a bargain is by adjusting the price as contract terms
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negotiating the marginal term is less than or equal to the right hand side of the
equation, one should expect to observe the term in the contract. The following
section uses this simple model of contractual completeness to evaluate the
impact of frequency, uncertainty, and insularity on contracting choices.
1. Frequency
The frequency variable has a relatively straightforward effect on the cost of
contracting. One can expect that as a certain type of transaction increases in
frequency the marginal cost of contracting (w in the equation above) for that
transaction decreases. There are at least two reasons for these decreasing
marginal costs. First, the ability to standardize contracts through forms
dramatically reduces the marginal cost of drafting contracts. This feature of
contracting resembles the economics of intellectual property insofar as there is
a large up front cost in drafting the initial contract, but the cost of replicating
that contract is relatively low. Second, if transactors learn about the contours of
the transaction as time goes on, then one would expect the cost of refining
contracts to decrease. This effect is not as dramatic as the standardization
effect, but nevertheless this learning effect should contribute to a decreasing
marginal cost of contracting even after realizing the economies from
standardization.
Figure 1 is a simple representation of the marginal costs of contracting as
the frequency of a given transaction increases. The cost curve rises quite
quickly at first. The initial steepness reflects the high cost of writing a
standardized contract for a given transaction. Yet after incurring the initial high
costs, the low cost of reproducing the language sharply reduces the marginal
cost of writing an additional contract. The marginal cost still decreases because,
as the transactors learn more about the contract, they can refine the
standardized language to better suit the risks attendant to the transaction. The
gentle decrease in slope after the steep rise in the cost curve reflects this
learning effect.
change.
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Given that frequency tends to allow an approach to zero, 99 what then will
be the effect of different types of dispute resolution on decisions about
contractual completeness? In the case of industry-specific arbitration, where
dispute resolution costs tend to be low and damages tend to be low with low
variance, one should expect to see any contract term that creates even a
moderate amount of surplus. The combination of low contracting costs and the
low cost of industry-specific arbitration create the possibility of writing nearly
complete contracts. In an almost complete contract, nearly all terms that create
a benefit to the parties appear in the contract because the cost per unit of
contracting and the marginal cost of resolving the dispute-the w and c terms,
respectively-approach zero. This dynamic suggests that where parties are able
to write nearly complete contracts, one should expect to see a preference for
formal interpretation.
Bernstein notices the high frequency of NGFA and cotton contracts, but
does not attribute the preference for formalism to this feature of the
transactions.100 Instead, she accounts for the disjunction of casual transactor
behavior and the strict contractual rules and interpretation among grain traders
by positing that in end game situations, such as litigation, traders derive surplus
from enforcing the strict rules in the contract.10 Bernstein uses this insight to
99. It is also worth noting that contracting costs are not always, or even often, symmetrical for
parties. An example would be in the form contact context. For the form-contract writer it is very easy to
add an additional term at a low marginal cost. For the form-contract taker it would be very difficult to
negotiate a desired term. Rather the best option for the contract taker is to search for a higher price
substitute good or service that comes with a contract with more favorable terms.
100. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 1817 (noting that grain companies employ hundreds of
merchandisers who "enter into numerous contracts each day"); Bernstein, supra note 10 at 1755
(discussing the "high velocity" of transactions in the cotton industry).
101. See id. at 1802.
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argue against the contextual provisions in the UCC. She does not, however,
acknowledge the possibility of variance among transactors concerning the
impact of the cost of contracting on interpretive preferences. Grain traders
engage in a high number of transactions and use a highly standardized and
much-litigated contract to carry out these transactions. ° 2 These frequent
transactions create a large economy of scale. These economies of scale mean
that traders can add or subtract contract terms at very low marginal cost
because the contract is used so frequently. Given these very low costs of
contracting one should expect the contracts such as those used by grain traders
to be nearly complete.
In contrast, infrequent contracting likely means that w (the cost per unit of
contracting) will be higher relative to frequent transactions. A higher w has a
number of consequences with respect to contracting and dispute resolution
distinctions. Rclativc to transactions that have a low value of w, contracts
governing infrequent transactions are likely to be more incomplete. This
relative incompleteness follows from the higher cost of negotiating additional
terms. Unlike frequent transactions, where transactors should be able to extract
most of the surplus from a transaction, the higher cost of transacting means that
transactors will have to leave out terms that would otherwise create a surplus
because it is too expensive to negotiate these terms.
All other things being equal, transactors who face large gaps in contracts
because of the high cost of filling those gaps may opt for more contextual
dispute resolution regimes as a more effective choice for addressing contractual
risk. Contextual interpretation may appeal because it provides a reasonably
accurate mechanism for filling in large gaps through the use of industry norms
and other sources of extrinsic evidence. 103 Relative to the high cost that would
be necessary to even attempt drafting the missing terms of a contract that
governs an infrequent transaction, transactors may be content to leave the gaps
in place and take their chances with contextual interpretation regimes.
One might argue that a choice between formal and contextual interpretive
regimes is of diminished consequence when there are substantial gaps in a
contract because the gap-filling task is similar regardless of regime. There are,
however, substantial reasons to believe that the degree of formality present in a
group of default rules, and the degree to which a given set of judges and
arbitrators are inclined to interpret contracts formally or contextually, will have
important consequences for transactors.
In more formal regimes, where judges and arbitrators are likely to put more
effort into discerning the meaning of contract terms before turning to extrinsic
102. See id. at 1816-17.
103. Recall, however, that transactions that are infrequent on the global and firm-specific
dimensions may not create ideal conditions for the evolution of efficient norms.
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evidence, parties will have an incentive to devote more resources to contract
drafting because it is more likely that the terms of the contract will have an
effect on the outcome of any litigation that arises. The interpretive regime may
also have significant consequences for the ex post behavior of parties. Leaving
a contractual gap when any litigation will take place in a more contextual
regime may provide a stronger assurance that parties will adhere to industry
norms and will generally comport themselves in a good faith manner, lest
evidence to the contrary be admitted in a dispute.
Finally, several scholars have identified important effects that default rules
can have on behavior and efficiency. Schwartz and Scott note that efficient
default rules are desirable because the drafting costs that would otherwise be
necessary to agree to these rules may preclude their inclusion in a written
contract. 04 Schwartz and Scott also assert that the effect of inefficient defaults
can be heightened when judicial action makes these defaults "sticky," in the
sense that courts can make it difficult to contract around defaults by requiring
extremely precise language to allow parties to discard a default rule. 10 5 Russell
Korobkin has shown that the "endowment effect" created by default rules can
affect the willingness-to-pay that first-year law students assign to the value of a
given rule. 106 Ben-Shahar and John Pottow have argued that default rules may
stick, among other reasons, because deviating from them may send undesirable
signals to counter-parties. 107 These potential effects of default rules may
provide additional reasons for transactors to prefer contextual defaults when
gaps would be particularly costly to fill.
2. Uncertainty
The initial review of uncertainty suggested that two types of uncertainty are
likely to have a significant impact on the cost of contracting: predictive
uncertainty and linguistic uncertainty. Recall that predictive uncertainty refers
to the difficulty in foreseeing the contingencies that could lead the transaction
awry. Predictive uncertainty may be, at least to some degree, a function of
frequency. At low levels of frequency a transaction with a high level of
predictive uncertainty could create high contracting costs due to the large
number of unknown contingencies that may make it difficult to anticipate
potential contractual problems. At a high frequency of transactions, the
104. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 13, at 596 ("The justification for a default rule is that it does
for parties what they would have done for themselves had their contracting costs been lower.").
105. See id. n. 20 (citing the intense lobbying by firms regarding proposed changes to Article 2 as
evidence of that firms are aware of this stickiness); see also Robert E. Scott The Rise and Fall of Article
2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009, 1049-53 (2002).
106. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
608 (1998).
107. See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. L.
REv. 651 (2006).
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contracting cost of a high degree of predictive uncertainty should diminish
because the larger number of transactions allows parties to spread the risk of
contingencies across the transactions. Figure 2 has a curve that depicts such an
effect. This curve reflects initially-steep increases in the cost of contracting that
diminish at higher levels of frequency.
Linguistic uncertainty is a more intractable problem than predictive
uncertainty. In general, it is unlikely that a transaction that is difficult to
describe in writing will become substantially easier to describe as the frequency
of the transaction increases. Consequently, the marginal cost of contracting
where there is linguistic uncertainty may be almost constant. One might find a
small decrease in the marginal cost of contracting as a result of a learning
effect; but, there is little reason to believe that this effect could do that much to
minimize a problem that reflects a fundamental difficulty with language. Figure
2 also depicts the contracting cost curve associated with high linguistic
uncertainty. Unlike predictive uncertainty, there is only a slight economy of
scale associated with linguistic uncertainty. As a result the cost curve rises at an
almost constant rate with a slight decrease in the marginal cost to account for
the learning effect that may come with a high frequency of transactions.
Figure 2
Low
High Predictive
Uncertainty
Frequency
High
Predictive uncertainty presents a rather straightforward issue of risk
management. To overcome predictive uncertainty, parties can include terms
that specify an outcome should performance become prohibitively costly. For
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example, parties can cheaply add escalator, cost-plus, or commercial
impracticability clauses to the contract if there is sufficient risk inherent in the
transaction. Negotiating this term should not be all that expensive because non-
performance for reasons related to cost should not be all that difficult to
demonstrate. The benefits, in terms of surplus and a decrease in the chance of a
dispute, are likely to be substantial from such a term. As a result, the w term in
situations of predictive uncertainty is likely to be low enough to justify
expending the costs necessary to negotiate such a term. Moreover, as Figure 2
demonstrates, at a high frequency of transactions the marginal cost per
transaction of adding these risk-spreading clauses declines. Consequently, it is
more likely that risk-spreading clauses will appear at high frequencies because
it is cost effective to include these clauses.
Linguistic uncertainty, where it is difficult to reduce the potential problem
to clear language, is a more difficult problem. Where terms are difficult to
memorialize, it will be more expensive for parties to properly characterize their
intentions. Accurately representing an agreement about a linguistically
uncertain term will presumably require more hours of higher quality legal
services. The equation above predicts that transactors will only be willing to
pay the marginal cost per unit of contracting when the expected surplus and
reduced possibility of a dispute justify that cost. If a term does not provide
these benefits, then parties will likely leave a gap in the contract with respect to
that term or they will choose not to engage in the transaction. Effective risk
management, however, requires providing for contingency planning should a
dispute arise concerning the gap, and the type of interpretive regime that parties
use can, of course, affect whether or not they decide to leave a gap.
Contrast the NGFA system with adjudication under Article 2 of the UCC.
In the NGFA system, according to Bernstein, the procedure for filling gaps is
as follows: arbitrators first look to the explicit language of the contract, then to
the trade rules of NGFA, and only then, with apparent reticence, is there an
examination of extrinsic evidence of trade practices.108 In adjudication under
the UCC, judges will first look to the explicit language of the contract before
turning to the default rules specified in Article 2. As a generalization, these
default rules often look to contextual evidence to fill in gaps such as course of
performance, trade usage, and industry practices.
There are at least two important differences in these approaches. First, there
is the intermediate set of trade rules in the NGFA arbitration system that do not
exist under Article 2. The existence of a background set of trade rules may
affect the gap-filling decisions of parties. Grain transactors may feel
108. Bernstein, supra note 9, at 1776-77. Bernstein asserts that if arbitrators exhaust all these
sources they will then turn to the UCC or other statutory sources. But see note 54, referencing a NGFA
decision where arbitrators favor industry custom over a written trade rule.
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comfortable not investing large amounts in contracting costs because they
know that there are codified rules that will fill in their gaps. In instances of
Article 2 adjudication, there may be stronger incentives to invest in gap filling
because of the lack of trade rules to fill out vague terms. Second, there may be
a different threshold for finding gaps in contracts. Bernstein portrays industry-
specific arbitration tribunals as reluctant to find gaps in contracts when there is
a contract term that generally speaks to a contested issue. So if arbitrators are
less willing to find gaps, there may be less of an incentive to invest in
additional contracting costs to fill gaps. Alternatively, in Article 2 adjudication,
courts may be more willing to find gaps and thus look to the contextual gap-
filling provisions of the UCC.' 09
The well-known case of Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co.
demonstrates the point.' 10 In Nanakuli an asphalt sales contract stated that the
price would be the sellcr's posted price at the time of delivery.' The buyer
claimed that it was a common trade usage, and was the course of performance,
to use "price protection," which is the price at the time when a buyer bids on a
project. 112 The court agreed, holding that "the jury could have reasonably
construed price protection as consistent with the express term."' 3 This
conclusion-which has some analogues in other decisions-may have been
quite a surprise for at least one of the parties.1 14 One can reasonably expect
such decisions to drive up the price of contracting-instead of simply
incorporating a posted price term, parties knowledgeable of decisions like
Nanakuli will have to negotiate explicit terms about whether to use or ignore
trade norms such as price protection. 115
These additional costs are not necessarily a negative feature of the UCC. As
Robert Gertner and Ian Ayres have pointed out, there may be good reasons to
include harsh default rules insofar as they spur parties to incorporate explicit
109. This statement is somewhat of a generalization because Article 2 adjudication takes place in a
wide number of jurisdictions, which may have different thresholds for finding a gap.
110. 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981).
111. Id. at 777.
112. Id. Unsurprisingly, there was a substantial difference between the price at the time of bidding
and the posted price at the time of delivery.
113. Id.at 780.
114. See also Allapattah Servs. v. Exxon Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (overriding a
black-letter price term because standards of good faith and commercial reasonableness, as measured by
trade norms, were contrary to the term); American Mach. & Tool Co. v. Strite-Anderson Mfg. Co., 353
N.W.2d 592, 597 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) ("The trend has been for judges, looking beyond written
contract terms to reach the 'true understanding' of the parties, to extend themselves to reconcile trade
usage and course of dealing with seemingly contradictory express terms. They have permitted course of
dealing and usage of trade to add terms, cut down on or subtract terms, or lend special meaning to
contract language.").
115. Schwartz and Scott make a similar point in their discussion of UCC § 2-202 and the related
commentary, which require the careful negation of an assumption that prior dealings and trade usage
have been incorporated into a contract. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 13, at 585.
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language about their intentions."16 Likewise, a low threshold for finding a gap
may provide an incentive for parties to write more concrete contracts. The
larger point of this study, however, is that different interpretive regimes are
appropriate for different types of transactions. Where linguistic uncertainty is
low and parties can codify expectations and standards with relative ease, it is
understandable that parties will have a strong distaste for dispute resolution
systems that are more willing to look outside the terms that the parties favor."
7
The use of extrinsic evidence may erode what parties perceive as their
bargained-for rights under a contract. For situations where there is high
linguistic uncertainty, however, this risk of erosion is less acute because the
larger gaps in the contract create more ambiguity about the underlying
contractual rights at issue. Contracts that contain contextual terms and dispute
resolution forums that provide contextual default rules may provide an effective
risk management solution for transactors who face high costs filling gaps. This
situation is particularly true when less contextually oriented regimes provide
for harsh results, such as rescission, in the presence of a contractual gap and a
prohibition on extrinsic evidence.
3. Insularity
One of the great insights of the literature on law and social norms is that
belief systems and community norms can provide powerful behavioral
incentives.118 This finding undoubtedly applies in the context of transacting
communities. Where a community is insular, there is likely to be a greater
consensus concerning what is and what is not a proper course of behavior.
Those who deviate from the consensus norms risk ostracism and harm to their
reputations. And, of course, in a more insular community the information about
the reputations of others will travel more quickly and is likely to lead to
stronger forms of sanction. These features of insular transacting communities
have important ramifications for decisions about contracting costs. In
particular, increased insularity is likely to decrease the importance of written
contracts in governing transactions. The reason for this decreased importance is
that high levels of insularity mean that extra-legal regulation of untrustworthy
transactors is likely to be inexpensive relative to more formal legal information.
The prospect of cheap extra-legal enforcement mechanisms provides a
substantial disincentive to invest in the contract drafting process. Put in terms
116. See generally, Ayres & Gertner, supra note 95.
117. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 13, at 592-94 (arguing that reliance on course of
performance to interpret contract terms is inappropriate when parties have incurred costs to state
expressly that their course of performance should not be relevant).
118. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
167-83 (1991); Robert D. Cooter, Inventing Market Property the Land Courts of Papua New Guinea, 25
LAW. & SOC. REV. 759 (1991); Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among
Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986).
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of the equation developed above, investing in filling in contractual gaps
provides too small a relative decrease in the p'(x)c term (the marginal cost of
litigation as a function of contractual completeness) to justify substantial use of
formal dispute resolution.
Contrasting Bemstein's studies of the diamond, grain, and cotton industries
provides some support for this claim. Assuming that insularity is a function of
group size and the degree of cultural homogeneity, one would expect the
diamond industry, which is small and has a very high degree of cultural
homogeneity, to have a less developed and less utilized dispute resolution
system relative to the less insular grain and cotton industries. Indeed, Bernstein
reports that some diamond transactions do not even involve written contracts
and that most transactors think of bills of sale as accounting devices rather than
contracts. 119 In the small number of disputes that diamond arbitrators hear, they
apply rules based on trade usage and custom. 120 When the skeletal contracts
and trade rules leave gaps, the arbitrators take a decidedly ad hoc approach. '
2
'
Bemstein explains the diamond industry's preference for arbitration and
reputation-based contracting as a consequence of the inadequacies of general
courts to provide truly compensatory damages. 22 The model above suggests
that rather than avoiding the damages used by general courts, diamond traders
are simply economizing on contracting costs by using gap-laden contracts.
The grain and cotton industries, which are larger and less homogeneous
than the diamond industry, appear to rely more heavily on written contracts. 
123
NGFA is quite large, with membership of over 1,000 firms that control over
5,000 facilities at varying levels within the grain industry. 124 Likewise,
Bernstein's study of the market for cotton claims that the entire American
cotton industry more or less operates under a private legal system. 25 The wider
scope of the grain and cotton industries relative to the diamond industry may
explain the stronger reliance on structured arbitration systems. Compared to the
diamond industry, both NGFA and the cotton industry have a more thoroughly
developed system of trade rules and arbitration and appear to generate more
119. Bernstein, supra note 42, at 123.
120. Bernstein reports transactors file about 150 cases each year and that roughly 15% of those
cases do not settle. Id. at 124.
121. See supra Sec. lll(A)(i).
122. Id. at 135-36.
123. To say that these industries rely more on formal contracts does not mean that they rely heavily
on these contracts, It is important to remember Stewart Macaulay's finding that businessmen seldom
refer to formal contractual language and have a strong distaste for contract disputes. See Stewart
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963);
but see Eric A. Feldman, The Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World's Premier Fish Market, 94 CAL.
L. REV. 313 (2006) (showing that transactors in Japanese tuna markets submit a substantial number of
claims to specialized tuna courts and that the high claim rate does not appear to impair ongoing
relationships).
124. See http://www.ngfa.org/ngfaprofile.asp.
125. See Bernstein, supra note 10, at 1724.
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cases.
Consistent with the contracting investment model developed above, one can
explain the increased reliance on a formal dispute resolution system as a
consequence of larger group size and decreased heterogeneity. These features
of the grain and cotton industries mean that informal means of governance are
less likely to be effective. As a result, the probability of using formal means of
dispute resolution increases, which justifies a higher investment in ex ante
contracting. 126 At the same time, the high frequency and low uncertainty of the
grain and cotton transactions likely create a preference for formal modes of
contract interpretation.
B. Applied Examples
Evidence from several industries suggests that the attributes of transactions
have an appreciable effect on the desire for more formal or more contextual
types of contract interpretation. This section discusses three industries that,
unlike those studied by Bernstein, generate gap-laden contracts that parties tend
to have interpreted with reference to significant amounts of extrinsic evidence.
1. Mergers and Acquisitions
Merger agreements are one of the more prominent instances of low
frequency transactions that involve significant uncertainty that can affect
preferences for different modes of contract interpretation. Several factors
contribute to this uncertainty. First, the extreme time pressure that is typical to
merger deals limits the ability of dealmakers and their attorneys to draft
complete contracts. This shortened time frame for ex ante investment in the
contract drafting process necessarily limits the amount of time to fill in gaps in
the contract. Second, the one-time nature of these transactions means that even
where there is time and the incentive to fill these gaps, it is difficult to do so
because the parties cannot rely on past experience with this specific transaction
to devise precise gap-filling terms. This effect can, of course, be mitigated by
the experience that the dealmakers and their attorneys have had with
substantially similar merger transactions. But the variation from deal to deal is
surely more significant in the transfer of complex business assets than it is in
the high-certainty world of commodities transactions.
Though it is difficult to obtain precise numbers, many merger agreements
choose Delaware courts as the forum to resolve any disputes; a choice
presumably influenced by the substantial experience that Delaware courts have
126. There is obviously still an important role for the spread of reputational information in the grain
and cotton industries. This section is only claiming that gossip will play a stronger governance role in
more insular industries relative to less insular industries.
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with corporate law. A recent case, United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc.
et al.,127 encapsulates the drafting problems that can arise with merger
transactions and how Delaware courts rely extensively on extrinsic evidence to
resolve those problems. The dispute in United Rentals involved the proper
remedy for the seller after the private equity firm, Cerberus, balked at closing
the transaction for the agreed upon price of $34.50 a share.128 The merger
agreement contained a specific performance provision that would be triggered
in the event the deal failed to close, but it also contained a clause that specified
a termination fee of $100 million as the sole remedy if the deal did not close. 29
After denying the seller's motion for summary judgment, which itself relied on
extrinsic evidence from the drafting of the agreement, the Chancellor held a
trial in which extensive testimony was taken from the dealmakers and their
attorneys regarding the meaning of the contract. The Chancellor's opinion
examined successive, but unexecuted, drafts of the contract in detail to try and
resolve the conflict between the specific performance provision and the
termination fee. 130 Chancellor Chandler ultimately found that evidence from
these drafts and testimony as to their meaning was inconclusive. He resolved
the case in favor of the buyer using the forthright negotiator principle, which
uses a particularly extreme form of extrinsic evidence-namely, on one of the
party's subjective understanding of the meaning of the contract. 131
If the initial commentary is any indication, United Rentals will likely
become a rich vein for corporate law scholars to examine issues that arise in
mergers. But the case is also relevant to the analysis of interpretive preferences
because it is a telling example that not all commercial parties prefer the
limitations on extrinsic evidence favored by the New Formalists. 132 One of the
127. United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc., 937 A.2d 810 (Del Ch. 2007).
128. Id. at 815, 827.
129. Id. at 815-17.
130. Id. at 836 ("At trial, both sides attempted to show that the extrinsic evidence led ineluctably to
that party's respective interpretation. This was an exercise in futility.")
131. Id. at 836-44 (discussing the testimony related to the buyer's subjective understanding of the
contract, evaluating the credibility of this evidence, and finding that the buyer understood the contract
not to include the specific performance remedy.)
132. Larry Ribstein reported the case on his blog and argued that the court wanted to signal to
similarly situated parties that they need to do a better job of drafting internally consistent contracts. See
http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2007/12/cerberus-uri-wh.html. ("Chandler's resolution gives the
parties an incentive to clearly communicate their intentions, which is another way to avoid the courts'
involvement in sticky disputes like this.") Jeffrey Lipshaw responded to Ribstein's post by emphasizing,
as this Article does, that merger agreements are far more complex than simple commodities transactions.
See http://www.concuringopinions.com/archives/2007/12/thecerberus ca.html ("One of the reasons I
love complex acquisition agreements as the subject of contract theory is that, like life, they are
incredibly complex. No mere agreement to buy 100 bushels of wheat in thirty days at X dollars per
bushel here! No, the agreements attempt to map a highly contingent future, one in which the
environment or the businesses can change, financing may not be available, bet the company lawsuits can
be filed, shareholder actions begun, and so on.") Steven Davidoff followed with analysis from the
perspective of mergers and acquisitions experts, see
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2007/12/the-dog-bites-c.html, and Ribstein responded to
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arguments forwarded by Scott and Schwartz in the Limits of Contract Law is
that formal contract rules, by constraining the ability of a court to take extrinsic
evidence, can reduce dispute resolution costs by allowing parties to resolve
cases on the basis of limited evidence-i.e., a motion to dismiss rather than
summary judgment.133 United Rentals provides an example where parties chose
a forum that was willing not only to entertain a summary judgment motion, but
was willing to hold a complete trial to ascertain the meaning of the contract.
The choice of a forum that is so solicitous of contextual evidence provides
some support for the argument that parties to transactions with low frequency
and high uncertainty may prefer to rely on ex post contextual interpretation
rather than exhaustive ex ante investment in contracting to resolve any disputes
that arise. Merger transactions may be particularly prone to this reasoning
because the added expense of contextual interpretation will typically pale in
comparison to the stakes of the transaction. For example, in United Rentals, the
difference between the $7 billion purchase price that would have been required
by specific performance and the $100 million termination fee surely dwarfed
the expenses associated with the summary judgment motions and subsequent
trial. Given these stakes, it is understandable that the parties would not want to
limit themselves to the language of a contract that was drafted under intense
time pressure and, instead, would prefer to introduce the array of contextual
evidence that provided insight into the nature of the parties' agreement.
Some recent empirical work bears on the choice of jurisdiction for mergers
and acquisitions. Ted Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller compiled a database of
merger and acquisition contracts filed with the SEC and coded these contracts
for a series of variables-state of incorporation and the agreement's choice of
law.' 34 The data show a strong relationship between these two variables; and,
as one might expect, acquirers incorporated in Delaware tend to choose
Delaware law to resolve disputes.' 35 When, however, one controls for state of
incorporation, parties appear to shift away from Delaware law in favor of
(mostly) California and New York law. 136 While the study is fascinating, it is
Lipshaw with a defense of his comments, see http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2007/12/lipshaw-
on-cerb.html.
133. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 13, at 577 ("courts that interpret contracts as typical parties
prefer would be indifferent to variance as well, and sensitive only to the costs of administering their
evidentiary standard.") Perhaps Schwartz and Scott would classify merger and acquisition contracts as
the type of high stakes, bet-the-company agreements where the increased accuracy of contextual
interpretation justifies the increased costs of litigation, but if it is correct that parties to a merger prefer
to use Delaware because of its contextual rules, this would be an argument in favor of variation among
jurisdictions with regard to formalist interpretation rather than the uniform formalism advocated by
Schwartz and Scott.
134. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1983-84 (2006)
(explaining the dataset).
135. Id. at 1987-88.
136. Id. at 1989.
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difficult to make inferences about interpretive preferences from these data.
Drawing any conclusions would require knowing how parties perceive
California and New York courts on the contextualism-formalism continuum
relative to Delaware. We do not have this information, so it would be difficult
to attribute much meaning to the relatively infrequent situations where parties
that have incorporated in Delaware choose a different state's law to govern a
merger.
Subsequent work by Eisenberg and Miller, however, makes bolder claims
about the appeal of New York as a jurisdiction for commercial litigation. 137
Using a sample that extends beyond merger contracts, Eisenberg and Miller
show that transactors appear to have a strong preference for choosing New
York law even when the parties to the contract have headquarters outside of
New York. 138 This preference appears to be particularly strong for companies
in California, who opt for New York law at a relatively high rate.
139
In a follow-up piece, Miller argues that the more formal interpretive
approach of New York courts and the more contextual approach of California
courts may account for these choices. 140 Miller marshals substantial doctrinal
support for this claim, although this review of published cases can only say so
much about actual outcomes and can only serve, at best, as an approximation of
what parties believe about these courts when they make choice-of-law
decisions. 141 Nevertheless, if Miller is correct, it would not be inconsistent with
the thesis I articulate here. Parties may choose New York law for transactions
that are best suited to formal adjudication and choose California law for
contracts where contextual interpretation best serves the needs of the parties.
Indeed, Eisenberg and Miller present evidence that choice-of-law
provisions vary substantially across transaction type. So, for example, in a
sample of 2,882 contracts, 412 governed mergers, 217 governed credit
commitments, 155 governed bond indentures, and 352 governed underwriting.
Of the merger contracts, thirty-two percent chose Delaware law and only
seventeen percent chose New York law.142 In contrast, eighty-nine percent of
all bond indenture contracts, forty-eight percent of all credit commitment
agreements, and ninety-three percent of underwriting contracts opted for New
York law. 143 While these descriptive statistics do not control for state of
137. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Flight to New York An Empirical Study of
Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts, CARDOZO L.
REV. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= I 14808.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Geoffrey Miller, Bargaining on the Red-eye: New Light on Contract Theory, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.c fm?abstractid=1 129805.
141. Id.
142. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 140, at 137.
143. Id.
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incorporation, they do suggest that the type of contract at issue can be factor in
deciding the appropriate law to govern a transaction. To the degree that United
Rentals is indicative of the place of Delaware courts on the formalist-
contextualist continuum, and insofar as the statistics above reflect a choice to
choose Delaware law for merger agreements at a higher rather than some other
contracts, the data could be read as evidence that parties prefer more contextual
approaches for merger transactions.
2. Tailored Software Contracts
The high technology industry presents a highly uncertain contracting
environment. Mark Suchman and Mia Cahill argue that the predominant role of
Silicon Valley lawyers is to mitigate and suppress this uncertainty by providing
gatekeeping, proselytizing, and sorting services to their venture capital
clients. 144 These authors also argue that Silicon Valley lawyers can create
surplus for their clients by incorporating industry norms into contracts and by
trying get these norms incorporated into national legal standards governing
venture capital and technology issues. 45 The authors argue such standardized
terms tend to represent the consensus norms of the industry and are set against
the backdrop of UCC § 1-205, which encourages tribunals to augment contract
interpretation with trade usage. 146 At least some problems in technology
contracting involve deep problems with linguistic uncertainty. Drafting
contracts to produce tailored pieces of software can pose particularly acute
problems of linguistic uncertainty because it can be difficult to reduce the
desired performance specifications to effective contractual language. Even with
substantial investments in contract drafting, it may not be possible to describe
the states of the world that would satisfy conforming tender with a sufficient
degree of accuracy. In this sort of situation, parties may prefer an ex post
application of industry norms and other extrinsic evidence to attempt to fill
gaps that are the product of ex ante linguistic uncertainty. This prediction
follows from the model developed above-in a case of linguistic uncertainty, w
(the marginal cost of an additional unit of contracting) is likely to be quite high
and, as a result, the parties may choose to leave a gap in the contract
Indeed, it appears that the complicated disputes that tailored software can
produce have created a market niche for consultants to evaluate delivered
software against industry norms and the original contract language. 147 Scholars
144. Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the
Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 LAW & SOC. INQ. 679, 698-703 (1996).
145. Id. at 703-08.
146. Id. at 705. See also U.C.C § 1-205 (3)("A course of dealing between parties and any usage of
trade in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or should be aware give
particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement.").
147. See, e.g., the explanation that Software Productivity Research gives for their services:
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of computer law argue that the complexity of software means that "[p]erfect
tender [would be] a disaster for the software industry where software may be
composed of millions of lines of code."' 148 Transactors presumably cannot
operate under rules of perfect tender in the software context because doing so
would require a massive investment in filling contractual gaps.
The inability to completely fill gaps caused by linguistic uncertainty means
that transactors must make choices of how to manage the risk posed by these
gaps. The choice of dispute resolution forum will, of course, affect the decision
about how significantly to invest in filling contractual gaps. Compare the gap
filling process in a regime that is formalistic, and thus generally hostile to
extrinsic evidence, versus a regime that welcomes contextual elements in
adjudication. Take, for example, a situation where parties litigate the question
of whether or not performance is conforming and there is an (efficient) industry
norm that speaks to this issue. In a regime that is more formal, transactors must
look to the language of the contract to determine whether performance is
conforming. If the norm is relatively easy to reduce to language (meaning a low
w), as it may be in the case of industry standards concerning definition of grain
grades, then one would expect to see this language in the contract. This
language can both clarify the expected performance, thus increasing the surplus
associated with the exchange, and decrease the expected probability and cost of
dispute by creating common expectations about the result. If the norm cannot
be easily reduced to contract language, as appears to be the case in language
concerning adequate tender in computer contracts, then transactors face a
number of choices about how best to manage this risk.
Transactors may decide that the benefits of memorializing their intentions
are worth the costly investment because the risk of a protracted and costly
dispute justifies the expense. Alternatively, transactors may opt to include a
term that directs tribunals to look to industry norms to decide a dispute. Yet
another choice is to leave a genuine gap in the contract. A clause that
references industry norms may be attractive for transactors when there are
generally efficient norms in the relevant community. For example, in the case
of the software industry it may be the situation that industry experts can
determine with relative ease whether a delivered product meets industry
standards for performance. 149 At the same time, it may be quite difficult to
"Customers claiming that the vendor delivered software late, delivered it with unacceptable error levels,
or failed to deliver it at all often cause disputes associated with breaches of contract. Vendors, on the
other hand, charge that customers unilaterally change the scope of agreements beyond the intent of the
original contract." Available at http://www.spr.com/dispute/breach.htm.
148. Michael L. Rustad, Symposium: Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act, Making
UCITA More Consumer-Friendly, 18 JOHN MARSHALL J. OF COMPUTER & INFO. L. 547, 573 (1999).
149. Clayton Gillette has articulated a framework for predicting when a transacting community
may favor the use of trade usage and custom in formal dispute resolution. See Clayton P. Gillette, The
Law Merchant in the Modern Age: Institutional Design and International Usages under the CISG, 5
CHI. J. INT'L. L. 157 (2004). He identifies observability of a practice as an important variable to predict a
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reduce these standards to language that is intelligible to a generalist jurist. As a
result, the most cost effective means of managing the risk of a dispute would be
a norm incorporation clause. Such a term would be quite inexpensive to draft,
but would also imply a relatively costly dispute resolution process because of
the need for expert testimony. This option may be less expensive than the cost
of attempting to overcome the problem of linguistic uncertainty through more
ex ante investment in drafting better contract terms. The choice of dispute
resolution forum may, however, make reference to industry norms unnecessary
because the default rules of the relevant forum take care of this decision.
3. Construction Contracts
Construction contracts often involve the low-frequency, high-uncertainty
characteristics that can lead to a preference for less formal rules of contract
interpretation. The presence of gaps in construction contracts stems, in part,
from the intense level of detail that these projects usually involve and the
narrow time windows that parties have to agree upon and specify these details
in an executed contract. 50 Rather than incur the significant costs that would be
necessary to draft a complete set of tailored contracts to govern the
relationships between owners, architects, general contractors, subcontractors,
and other involved parties, the construction industry relies heavily on form
contracts. The American Association of Architects ("AIA") provides a series of
boilerplate agreements that can be minimally tailored by filling in blanks and
checking boxes. Use of the AIA contracts dominates the industry; updates to
this documentation take place approximately every ten years and this process
occasions much comment and discussion from the interested parties.
The reliance on standard form contracts suggests relatively minimal ex ante
investment in contract drafting. This feature appears to differentiate
construction contracts from the more highly tailored contracts observed in the
mergers and acquisitions context. The typically lower stakes of construction
contracts relative to the deal size observed in United Rentals may explain why
transactors in the construction industry tend to avoid high levels of ex ante
investment. 151 Those in the construction industry may also benefit from the
repeated-and likely consistent-judicial interpretation of key clauses in these
preference for incorporation, although he does not emphasize the role that linguistic uncertainty may
play in incorporation preference. Id. at 163.
150. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law: Reality and Reform in a
Transactional System, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 463, 531-35 (1998) (finding that the intense time pressure
associated with many construction contracts leads to the presence of rational gaps in construction
contracts).
151. If the hypothesis that the stakes of the transaction explain some of the reliance on standard
form contracts is correct, one would expect, all other things being equal, that high-stakes construction
projects would rely less on the standard form contracts relative to low-stakes projects.
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standardized contracts.1 52 But this aspect of construction contracts may create
some tension insofar as transactors must trade off the value of a less-than-ideal
contract term against the benefit of increased certainty about how a court is
likely to interpret that term. 153
The ex post dispute resolution choices in the construction industry
differentiate it from the preference for formal adjudication observed the high-
frequency low-uncertainty commodities transactions studied by Bemstein.
From 1888 to 2007, the AIA owner-contractor agreements mandated that any
disputes be resolved through compulsory arbitration. 154 Unlike the diamond,
grain, and cotton transactors discussed above, the AIA and the larger
construction industry have not established a specialized court that favors
limitations on extrinsic evidence and other features of formal interpretation.
Instead, the AIA arbitration framework default is the use of the American
Arbitration Association ("AAA") rules, the canonical set of rules for general
commercial arbitration.155 This long-standing feature of construction contract
govemance suggests a preference for the contextual interpretation that general
commercial arbitration usually entails.
One observes further evidence of the absence of a desire for formal
interpretation in the commentary to the 2007 revision of the contractor-owner
form agreements. In a significant change, the AIA altered the mandatory nature
of the arbitration clause and allowed parties to choose between arbitration and
litigation, with litigation as the default. The AIA's published discussion of that
revision, which synthesizes the comments received from construction industry
participants, does not contain any suggestion that a preference for less reliance
on extrinsic evidence factored in the decision. This absence is not surprising
because-relative to the industry-specific arbitration discussed above-general
commercial arbitration and conventional litigation may not differ substantially
in their willingness to engage in contextual interpretation. Rather, the
commentary addresses the common tensions between general commercial
arbitration and litigation observed by other commercial actors and
academics. 156 Those who favored arbitration preferred the ability to designate
152. Michelle Boardman argues that the ongoing dialogue between insurance attorneys and courts
that occurs through repetition and refinement of often-used, but arcane, contract terms is an important
and underappreciated aspect of insurance contracts. See Michelle Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The
Allure ofAmbiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105 (2006).
153. Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner develop the theory of the tradeoff between the benefits of
contract term standardization and the potential costs posed by the path dependency of contract term
harmonization and conduct an empirical explanation into these effects in the context of bond covenants.
See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or
"'The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997); see also Michael Klausner, Corporations,
Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995).
154. See AlA 2007 Revisions to Contract Documents at 4, available at
http://www.aiacv.org/AIAContractDocumentRevisions2007.pdf.
155. Id. at 5.
156. Id. at 4.
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industry specialists to resolve disputes rather than present their cases to the
generalist jurists encountered in litigation. The complaints about arbitration
focused on limited appeal rights and a cost structure that can equal or exceed
public litigation.' 57 This commentary suggests that transactors in the
construction industry, unlike those in the commodity industries studied by
Bernstein, do not have an especially strong aversion to dispute resolution
frameworks that take a solicitous view of extrinsic evidence.
V. SYNTHESIS AND THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION DECISION
The model of gap filling developed in this Article speculates that the
attributes of a transaction will affect the decision of how much to invest in the
contracting process and also will influence the choice of dispute resolution
mechanism. This section synthesizes the arguments and the contracting model
developed above to suggest how transactions will sort themselves into different
dispute resolution regimes, such as industry-specific arbitration, general
commercial arbitration, and public adjudication under the UCC. This section
subsequently discusses intermediate mechanisms for managing the risk created
by contextual gaps before making some concluding comments, including a
table that predicts the dispute resolution choices for different transactions
according to their frequency, uncertainty, and insularity.
A. Industry-Specific Arbitration
As the review of Bernstein's work indicates, much industry-specific
arbitration uses formal methods of interpretation. These approaches severely
restrict the use of extrinsic evidence and strive to find the governing standards
of a transaction within the four corners of the applicable contract. This sort of
formal interpretation has several likely effects on the elements of the
contracting model developed above. Relative to more contextual approaches,
formal rules almost certainly decrease the probability of protracted legal
disputes because these rules make it easier to predict likely outcomes. The
relative ease of application of formal rules and the limited discovery rights
typical of industry-specific arbitration should also have the effect of
minimizing dispute resolution costs. Collectively, these factors suggest that
formal dispute resolution is likely to decrease the p(x)c term (which measures
the cost of dispute resolution as a function of contractual completeness). The
apparent ability of formal interpretation to lower the expected costs associated
with litigation implies that this approach will be particularly appealing when
transactions are frequent and when each transaction involves relatively low
stakes. When transactions have these features, the prospect of expensive
157. Id.
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adjudication may eliminate the surplus from exchange for a substantial number
of transactions. 
58
A high frequency of transactions will also facilitate the ability of transactors
to draft complete contracts by driving down the marginal costs of contracting.
If predictive and linguistic uncertainty is low, as it appears to be in the
commodity markets studied by Bernstein, one would expect the low marginal
cost of contracting to produce contracts that are relatively free of gaps, which
transactors prefer to have interpreted in the highly formal manner that one
observes in some instances of industry-specific arbitration.
B. General Commercial Arbitration
General commercial arbitration has been associated with lower dispute
resolution costs relative to public litigation, although some have challenged that
view recently. 59 Arbitration differs from industry-specific arbitration, as well
as public litigation, in that it generally provides parties with much more
confidentiality in resolving disputes. 160 Firms may prefer this privacy because
158. For casual empirical evidence that the costs of a straightforward commercial contract dispute
are approximately $10,000 see Melvin A. Eisenberg and Brett H. McDonnell, Expectation Damages and
the Theory of Overreliance, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1335, 1369 (2003) (suggesting that more complex cases
require legal fees in the $50,000 to $100,000 range and that high-stakes claims regularly produce legal
fees over $I million).
159. While arbitration can save costs through limited discovery and circumscribed appeal rights,
the parties do have to pay for the arbitrators, which can diminish or even eliminate the cost savings
associated with arbitration. Some have suggested that this feature of arbitration may eliminate any cost
advantage relative to public litigation. See, e.g., Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It They Will Come:
Contracts To Remake The Rules Of Litigation in Arbitration's Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 579
(2007) (suggesting that arbitration may not offer a cost advantage relative to trials because parties must
pay the arbitrators). But see Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An
Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56
DEPAUL L. REV. 335 (2007) (documenting a decline in the use of arbitration and suggesting cost as a
factor); Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the "Vanishing Trial": The Growth and Impact of
"Alternative Dispute Resolution," I. J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843, 876 (2004) (suggesting that
arbitration costs less relative to use of the public courts); U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Alternate
Dispute Resolution: Employers' Experiences With ADR in the Workplace 19 (1997) (finding lower fees
in the context of employment arbitration); Lewis L. Maltby, The Projected Economic Impact of the
Model Employment Termination Act, 536 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 103, 117 (1994) (same).
160. See Omri Ben-Shahar and Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109 YALE
L.J. 1885, 1918 n. 91 (2000) ("In general, a desire to keep proceedings private is an important reason
that transactors opt for alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"). The press and other members of the
public who have wide access to judicial proceedings have no right to attend private ADR proceedings.")
In addition, the American Arbitration Association advises that arbitrators render judgments in secret
without findings of fact or law. See American Arbitration Ass'n, Commercial Arbitration Rules, R. 42-
45 (1993). Moreover, practice manuals that tout arbitration tend to emphasize secrecy as a primary
benefit of arbitration. See, e.g., Thomas C. Klein, Non-Disclosure Agreements in Venture Capital
Transactions, 4 ADVISING START-UP & EMERGING COMPANIES 1 (2003) ("[Arbitration clauses] will
prevent any disputes from being played out in public, and will be a faster, and therefore more efficient,
route to a resolution of the dispute. The outcomes of arbitration are no better or no worse than those of a
court, but the process can be confidential, and is speedier and therefore less expensive."); Danielle
Fugazy, John Delaney & Jay Rand, Did You Check With Counsel? Attorneys Growing Role in VC, VEN.
CAP. J. (Jan. I, 2003) ("Venture capitalists have an interest in not airing their dirty laundry in public, and
arbitration clauses are a good way to make sure disputes are handled quietly and confidentially. If
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it keeps trade secrets from the public record and diminishes the risk of loss in
reputation or brand value because of questionable practices exposed in the
course of litigation. Arbitration, however, is not without its costs. 16 Relative to
public litigation and the industry-specific arbitration studied by Bernstein,
arbitration provides less predictable results; this is because limited appeal rights
provide arbitrators with substantial discretion to resolve disputes. 162 The
secrecy attendant to general commercial arbitration also contributes to
uncertainty because, while one may be familiar with the reputation of an
arbitrator, there will be substantially less information about how the arbitrator
decides cases due to the lack of publicly available opinions.'
6 3
This mix of costs and benefits highlights the situations where arbitration
may be an attractive option. Assuming that the conventional wisdom about the
costs of arbitration is correct, this means that the c term in the equation above is
likely to be lower under arbitration regimes. 164 Like industry-specific
arbitration, this low-cost feature will make general commercial arbitration
attractive in low-stakes transactions. Low-stakes transactions presumably create
smaller amounts of surplus. As a result, the prospect of high-cost adjudication
under common law or the UCC may create a disincentive to using public
adjudication because the expected cost of resolving the dispute eclipses the
surplus from the transaction. Arbitration may also appeal in situations where
high uncertainty creates a barrier to drafting complete contracts. The more
contextual approach of arbitrators-at least relative to industry-specific
arbitration-may allow beneficial ex post gap filling by looking to industry
norms, evidence from drafting, and other extrinsic indicia of the parties'
intentions. 165 It appears, therefore, that arbitration may appeal where the stakes
disputes have to be argued in a courtroom, it's hard to keep that out of the press.")
161. Some believe that the freedom that arbitrators typically enjoy means that arbitration can
approach lawlessness. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 725 (1999) (stating "arbitrators often do not follow the
law"). A recent overview of the empirical work the claims that underlie the assertion of lawlessness-
such as the belief that arbitrators do not follow the law, that parties choose arbitration to avoid
mandatory rules, and the argument that arbitration stunts the development of the common law-finds
little support for them. See Christopher Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LO'. L. REV. 187 (2006).
162. See generally Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in the Age of Mandatory
and Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449 (2004) (balancing the benefits of speedy and
inexpensive arbitration against the dangers of limited appeal rights).
163. Of course, if an attorney or firm has experience with a given arbitrator there will be more
information about her tendencies and thus more certainty in predicting a result. As a general matter,
however, both the secrecy of arbitration agreements and the requirements of attomey-client privilege
will tend to stem the flow of information about arbitrators. This lack of reputational evidence may be
mitigated by the fact that many arbitrators are retired judges who are generally familiar to the legal
community. One should not, however, ignore the prospect that judges may decide cases quite differently
when their opinions will not be published and will not be subject to appellate review.
164. Note that lower the costs of a dispute may make a dispute more likely because it is less
expensive to pursue and defend a claim.
165. A study by Christopher Drahozal nicely illustrates the different approaches that general
arbitrators take to contextual evidence relative to their industry-specific counterparts. Drahozal surveyed
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of a transaction are low, but where there is insufficient frequency to allow for
boilerplate and uncertainty precludes effective contract drafting. 66 This set of
attributes fairly describes the context of many employment contracts-a
situation where it is difficult to describe the expected obligations of each party,
but the stakes of a contract may not justify the high expense associated with
public litigation. It is not surprising then, that Ted Eisenberg and Geoffrey
Miller's study of publicly available contracts finds a particularly high incidence
of arbitration clauses in employment contracts. 1
67
There may also be an organizational benefit to the open-ended nature of
arbitration decisions. When arbitrators are not bound by formal law, they may
tend to decide cases on the basis of general conceptions of good-faith behavior.
Put differently, arbitrators that are not bound by any formal law may have a
freer hand to punish what they view as audacious or bad-faith behavior. This
tendency can economize on organizational costs by minimizing monitoring
costs for firms. Instead of investing the potentially large costs in educating
employees on the sometimes arcane and counter-intuitive rules that come with
formal legal rules firms can rely on internalized norms of good faith. 168 By
encouraging corporate cultures that promote corporate norms of good faith,
arbitration opinions issued by the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") and found some support
for the conclusion that international transactors like rules that fill contractual gaps with business norms,
but he did not find similar support for course-of-performance rules. See Christopher R. Drahozal,
Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and International Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 79 (2000). Though it is difficult to generalize given the lack of information provided
about transactors by the ICC, this study may provide some support for the notion that high-stakes
uncertain transactions generate a preference for more contextual interpretation. See id. at 97 (stating that
the ICC cases involve "higher stakes transactions than the trade association arbitrations in Professor
Bernstein's study.").
Clayton Gillette also contrasts international arbitration with the work of Bernstein and uses the context-
driven approach of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods ("CISG") as a foil
for the claims of Schwartz and Scott. He specifies a theory to predict when transactors will prefer the
incorporation of trade usage and custom into their legal obligations and suggests that international trade
meets these conditions. Gillette then claims that adjudication under the CISG meets the desires of these
transactors for an institution that accommodates this incorporation preference. See Clayton P. Gillette,
The Law Merchant in the Modern Age: Institutional Design and International Usages under the CISG, 5
CHI. J. INT'L. L. 157 (2004). See also Avery Wiener Katz, The Relative Costs of Incorporating Trade
Usage into Domestic Versus International Sales Contracts: Comments on Clayton Gillette, Institutional
Design and International Trade Usages Under the CISG, 5 CHI. J. INT'L. L. 181 (2004) (arguing that
Gillette does not take full account of the costs related to more contextual approaches to interpretation
and offering additional reasons why parties may have a stronger preference for more substantive
interpretation in international transactions relative to cases that would be subject to domestic U.S.
courts).
166. One suspects that arbitration will be favored where insularity is too low to allow for the
establishment of a private legal system that has been tailored to the needs of an industry.
167. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, supra note 161, at 350. Eisenberg and Miller
find that 37% of publicly available employment contracts contain arbitration clauses. This study also
observes a highly negative correlation between contract standardization and arbitration clauses. That
finding supports the inference that a high frequency of transactions-which permits the effective
standardization of contract terms-can contribute to a preference against the contextual nature of
arbitration.
168. See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLOM. L. REV.
1253 (1999).
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firms can promote generally efficient practices that also may serve them well
when disputes wind up in arbitration. For example, by terminating employees
that engage in sharp dealing and other opportunistic practices that deviate from
accepted norms, firms can minimize the risk of adverse decisions in the context
of arbitration. 169 Depending on the contours of a given industry this method of
governance may be superior to relying on a formal, industry-specific arbitration
system.
C. Public Adjudication Under the UCC and Common Law
Adjudication under the UCC and common law in the public court system
differs from industry-specific arbitration and general commercial arbitration in
important ways. The most important difference is the generally higher cost of
litigation under the UCC. These higher costs stem from generally longer
discovery and pre-trial periods as well as the possibility of undergoing a
lengthy appeals process. The contextual nature of many UCC rules contributes
to the higher dispute resolution costs by placing a higher evidentiary burden on
parties. Rules such as course of performance and looking to industry norms will
tend to require more significant investments in discovery, depositions, and
expert testimony when compared to the more formal rules associated with
industry-specific arbitration. 17 One consequence of these higher costs is an
increased pressure to settle cases. 171 Settling cases benefits both parties by
saving them the costs associated with dispute resolution. Settling cases will
tend to eliminate some of the variance in damages across dispute resolution
regimes; however, settlement values should still reflect, to some degree,
expected damages and expected dispute resolution costs. 172
Using the framework developed above, one can venture a prediction about
when the UCC approach may be appealing to transactors. Given that the UCC
entails large litigation costs, it is likely the case that UCC litigation will be
more appealing to transactors engaging in high-stakes transactions. In high-
stakes transactions the potentially high cost of dispute resolution will serve as
169. Bernstein makes much of the lack of a good-faith requirement in the NGFA rules. There
certainly is something to the argument that an overly flexible approach to waiver and course of
performance rules can impose rigidity and significant monitoring costs on organizations. But even
NGFA arbitrators will not countenance what they view as large deviations from important industry
norms, even if they are not part of any written contract or of the trade rules. See supra note 54.
170. It is difficult to make concrete conclusions about the cost differential between general
commercial arbitration and public adjudication. The starkest contrasts between the two are the more
limited appeal rights in general commercial arbitration and the need to pay the arbitrators, but not public
judges. As discussed above, it is not entirely clear what the net cost difference will be between these two
options, see supra note 159.
171. Given higher litigation costs associated with UCC litigation there will be a higher surplus from
settlement agreements. The higher surplus should produce a higher rate of settlement relative to regimes
where litigation costs are lower.
172. ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 398-402 (3d. ed. 2000).
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less of an impediment because of the larger surplus associated with higher
stakes transactions. As the section on uncertainty discussed, transactions with a
high amount of uncertainty are also likely create a preference for adjudication
under the UCC because the contextual approach of the default rules can be a
useful aid to filling in gaps in uncertain contracts. For all these reasons, high-
stakes high-uncertainty transactions are candidates for adjudication under the
UCC (as the examples of mergers and tailored software contracts suggested).
While general commercial arbitration may be an attractive option for some of
these sorts of transactions, at the highest stakes one may see stronger
preferences for public litigation if the ability to appeal satisfies a demand for
enhanced accuracy. 1 73
Of course, one should not treat adjudication under the UCC as a monolithic
choice-jurisdictions may vary widely in how they apply their versions of the
UCC. Some rccent empirical work by Ted Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller
suggests that transactors be aware of this jurisdictional variance and may
choose the law that governs a transaction accordingly.
D. Intermediate Solutions
The previous analysis implies that there are relatively strong distinctions
between industry-specific arbitration, general commercial arbitration, and
adjudication under the UCC. These dispute resolution mechanisms are, of
course, not the only choices available to transactors-there is a broad array of
mechanisms available for minimizing the risk and costs that come with dispute
resolution. One particularly common technique that many industries use when
private legal systems are not feasible is the production of a set of trade rules
that memorialize the best practices of the industry. Among other things, these
standards help to economize on contracting and dispute resolution costs by
providing a benchmark for gauging behavior. 1
74
As evidence from the software industry demonstrates, 175 experts may fill
173. See supra note 89 (discussing Schwartz and Scott's arguments on the role of accuracy and
decreased variance in bet-the-company litigation).
174. Bernstein lists the following groups as having codified trade rules: American Cotton Shippers
Association, American Fats and Oils Association, American Peanut Shellers Association, American
Seed Trade Association, American Spice Trade Association, American Tin Trade Association,
Association of Food Industries, Binding Industries of America, Burlap and Jute Association, Cocoa
Merchants' Association of America, Colorado Grain and Feed Association, Diamond Dealers Club,
General Arbitration Council of the Textile and Apparel Industries (Worth Street Rules), Green Coffee
Association of New Orleans, Green Coffee Association of New York, Kansas City Board of Trade,
Memphis Cotton Exchange, Merchants Exchange of Portland, Mid-America Commodity Exchange,
National Cottonseed Products Association, National Hay Association, National Institute of Oilseed
Products, North American Wholesale Lumber Association, Pacific Coast Coffee Association, Pacific
Northwest Grain and Feed Association, Pennsylvania Rice Millers' Association, Rubber Trade
Association, Specialty Coffee Association of America, Tea Association of the USA, Texas Cotton
Association, and the Texas Grain and Feed Association. See Bernstein, supra not 9, at 1805 n. 134.
175. See supra Section (IV)(A)(ii).
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the market niches created by the risk associated with dispute resolution. In
particular, where there are high degrees of uncertainty in transactions, one
should expect to see consultancies that develop expertise in evaluating the
disputes that this uncertainty creates. Expertise in these areas can create surplus
by minimizing the risk associated with these transactions. Another similar,
interstitial, solution to managing risk is the use of specialized arbitrators.
Transactors sometimes use arbitrators that have developed expertise in a
particular subject area. These specialized arbitrators can also develop
reputations for more formal or more contextual approaches to dispute
resolution. This feature of specialized arbitrators can make them suitable for
transactions with a wide variety of attributes. Use of specialized arbitrators
presumably economizes on dispute resolution costs because these arbitrators
already have some idea of the background context of the transaction. Moreover,
these specialized arbitrators are likely to render more accurate results,
minimizing the risk attendant to the lack of appeal rights.
E. Conclusion
The wide variety of choices available in the market for dispute resolution
demonstrates that part of effective risk management for different transactions is
choosing the style of interpretation that best suits the transaction. While it is
certainly significant that grain, diamond, and cotton transactors largely opt out
of Article 2 of the UCC, it is just as relevant to understanding interpretive
preferences that many transactors chose more contextual methods of dispute
resolution such as public adjudication under the UCC and general commercial
arbitration.
The variation observed in dispute resolution decisions made by actual
transactors suggests that there may be limits to the New Formalism. The
empirical and theoretical observations of the New Formalists provide powerful
explanations of some observed dispute resolution preferences, but there is
reason to believe that these insights are most appropriate where transactions are
frequent and certain-features that allow transactors to draft relatively
complete contracts. It is a more open question whether these conclusions are
correct when the uncertainty and infrequency of other transactions result in
gap-laden contracts. That there may be instrumental reasons for transactors to
prefer more contextual types of contract interpretation in these situations
suggests that there is a need for a more pluralistic approach to the
formalism/contexualism debate than has traditionally been taken by contracts
scholars. Rather than inquiries into whether formal or contextual rules are
superior in all situations, it may be more instructive to take a closer look at the
choices transactors make in different situations. This pluralistic view, if correct,
is a necessary predicate to understanding how the default rules of commercial
contract interpretation should be structured to minimize contracting costs.
Vol. 6.1, 2009
HeinOnline  -- 6 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 54 2009
